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In literature, it is difficult to find the answer on how the monetary policy affects 
the regional economies and sectoral industries. In the partial equilibrium framework, 
most of the studies are only focused on some region and particular sector in a region. 
This is because of the lack of data availability. Moreover, the development of the 
general equilibrium framework using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) and 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) are concentrated on the national level 
model. Only a few researchers produce disaggregated model using these methods. It 
happened because introducing sectoral and regional dimension into general equilibrium 
framework makes the model much more complicated and hard to solve.  
Given this situation, this dissertation attempts to narrow the gap in the literature 
by building comprehensive tools to analyze the impact of the monetary policy to 
regional economies and industries that can help policymakers especially central bank as 
a monetary authority to come out with a policy recommendation. In this study, the 
scope of monetary policy is limited to the interest rate policy as the primary instrument 
that is used by the central bank.  
This dissertation consists of three essays on different issues and various methods 
to address the issues. However, the bottom line is similar, namely the impact of the 
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monetary policy on the regional and sectoral economies in Indonesia. The dissertation 
introduces the sectoral and regional dimension into the model which can create 
comprehensive tools for policy analysis as mentioned before.  
As a starting point, in the first chapter, the sectoral investment equations are 
developed using dynamic panel estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond to analyze 
the determinants of sectoral investment and also the impact of real interest rate to the 
sectoral investment. Moreover, this chapter also estimates the aggregated national 
investment as a benchmark and then compares the weighted elasticity parameters of real 
interest rate between those models to show how the results are different in every sector. 
It found that the weighted real interest rate coefficients between the aggregated national 
investment equation and the sectoral investment equation are quite different. According 
to the sectoral investment model, the most affected sector by the change in real interest 
rate is Non-Oil and Gas Manufacturing sector instead of Oil and Gas Manufacturing 
sector as obtained from aggregated national investment model. Thus, the policymakers 
should use the real interest rate estimate from sectoral investment equations instead of 
the coefficient from aggregated investment one to avoid the misleading policy 
recommendation.  
The second chapter aims to build a comprehensive model for analyzing the 
impact of shocks and/or policies not only national economy but also the regional 
economy in more detail for every sector in the economy. The model is called Financial 
Computable General Equilibrium (FIRCGE) model. In addition, this paper also 
analyzes on how central bank as a monetary authority and government as a fiscal 
authority should coordinate in order to achieve specific objective given the specific 
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shocks. Moreover, this study wants to compare the effectiveness of the combination of 
interest rate and different fiscal stimulus rule, which are an untargeted fiscal stimulus 
and a targeted fiscal stimulus. 
In this experiment, the FIRCGE model is able to generate an iso-loss curve that 
might be useful for both central bank, and government in providing the possible 
combination of fiscal stimulus and interest rate based on the objective or loss function 
that they choose. It found that in Indonesia, the combination of targeted fiscal stimulus 
and interest rate is more efficient than the combination of untargeted fiscal stimulus and 
interest rate in the loss function which has neutral weight on both inflation and GDP 
stability. 
The third chapter aims to construct five region DSGE models, estimates the 
optimal monetary policy and then analyzes how the central bank should react to the 
regional shocks. In addition, this chapter tries to address the question of how 
disaggregation of the national model into the regional model is necessary. This study 
found that currently, the monetary policy reaction function in Taylor rule is not optimal. 
The central bank of Indonesia did not react optimally to the regional shocks given the 
objective function. It also demonstrated that disaggregating national model into regional 
model would lead to better performance in term of the loss function. Thus, it suggested 
that the policymakers should use the disaggregated regional DSGE model if they are 
dealing with the regional shocks in order to get the optimal policy response. 
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CHAPTER 1  
THE IMPACT OF REAL INTEREST RATE ON SECTORAL INVESTMENT  
IN INDONESIA 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Investment is the important catalyst to achieve sustainable economic growth and 
poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries because it can create 
entrepreneurship and employment opportunity that improves people’s standard of 
living. Investment is generated from the internal funds such as profits, retained 
earnings, and stakeholder financing, or from external fund namely private placement 
and public offerings of shares in the stock markets. In addition, investment also comes 
from short term financial sector credit, long-term capital raising from the secondary 
market and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
In fact, there is a correlation between investment and the economic growth rate. 
Suhendra and Anwar (2014) argued that in Indonesia, the faster economic growth rate 
can be achieved from the higher private and government investment. From this finding, 
it implies that the government should create a conducive investment climate in the 
economy that can be done by institutional reforms such as efficient bureaucracy, fiscal 
incentive, the rule of law, etc.  
Based on World Bank (2005), a conducive investment climate creates incentives 
and opportunities for firms to expand their business, invest in productive machines, and 
create more jobs. Therefore, it promotes economic growth and poverty reduction. The 
ingredients of a sound investment climate included macroeconomic stability, the proper 
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level of certainty on government policies, strong contracting and judicial system, 
reliable social, physical and technology infrastructure, and clear property right, good 
functioning financial market, and educated healthy individuals. Besides these, the 
access to international markets is also important because it facilitates the flow of capital, 
goods, ideas, and technology. 
Since investment is a crucial factor in economic growth, it is worthwhile to 
investigate factors that determines the level of domestic investment in developing 
countries. This study analyzes the impact of real interest rate in determining the 
investment in the economy. This research will help the policy maker especially Bank 
Indonesia to see the tradeoff between fighting inflation by increasing the interest rate 
and stimulating investment. In addition, based on Dennis et al. (2013), monetary policy 
has a different impact on the firm's real net sales growth rate in various sectors in the 
US economy. This finding suggests that we also need to model investment equation for 
every industry if we want to understand the different impact of real interest rate on the 
investment in each sector. 
 
Figure 1.1  The Share of GDP Component from 2000Q1 until 2014Q1 
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 Figure 1.1 above shows the share of GDP component from 2000 quarter 1 
(2000Q1) until 2014Q1 in Indonesia. As can be seen, the share of consumption is 
declining over time with the long-run average of 58%. In contrast, the share of 
investment is increasing from 18.7% in 2000Q1 to 24.3% in 2014Q1. This indicates that 
investment has become a critical component for economic development in Indonesia. 
Hence, central bank as policy maker should understand more about the transmission 
mechanism of its policies through the investment.  
 The existing empirical research on the determinants of private investment in 
developing Asian countries has been dominated by multi-country cross-sectional 
regression due to the data availability. This regression analysis is based on the 
assumption of homogeneity across countries. In reality, this assumption is not entirely 
correct because, in fact, different countries have different economic structures and 
different institutional aspects. Thus, the analysis of the determinants within a country 
across regions has more robust results in this case. 
 Moreover, the current studies about the determinant of investment in Indonesia 
mainly focus only on a national level. Only a few papers are dealing with more 
disaggregated level with an emphasis on a particular area in Indonesia. None of them 
have introduced a comprehensive sectoral dimension in the model. The lack of an 
empirical study on sectoral investment in Indonesia creates a gap that needs to be filled. 
This study tries to cover this gap using Indonesian sectoral data. 
For the central bank as a monetary authority, the estimation of the sectoral 
investment equation is more important than that of the regional investment equation 
because the policymakers in the central bank only focus on the relationship between 
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investment and interest rate, as the main monetary instrument, and the impact of interest 
rate in the investment in the certain region depends on what sectors are the primary 
economic driver in that region. In other words, every region has different characteristics 
based on the industrial or sectoral classification. Therefore, the study on sectoral 
investment is more relevant in this matter. 
The investment consists of expenditures on machinery, capital equipment, 
inventories, new plants, etc. The investment decision depends on marginal benefits 
which are the expected rate of businesses’ return and marginal cost namely interest rate 
paid from borrowed fund. Someone will invest if expected rate of return exceeds 
interest rate, so higher interest rate would reduce investment. Or in other words, there is 
a negative parameter of interest rate elasticity on investment equation. This parameter 
indicates the sensitivity of investment in the particular sector to the change in interest 
rate. 
This research aims to analyze the determinants of investment especially the effect 
of real interest rate on investment in 20 sectors using time-series cross-sectional data 
across regions/provinces in Indonesia. It also investigates the important of having 
sectoral investment equation compared to the aggregated national one. This will show 
how much different in term of elasticity of real interest rate on investment if the central 
bank still uses the aggregated national investment equation. In addition, this study also 
tries to identify the most affected sector on the change of real interest rate. This 
information can help central bank as a policy maker to have a better understanding of 
how to promote investment in the particular sector. 
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1.2 Hypothesis 
This study tries to investigate the relationship between sectoral investment and its 
determinants especially real interest rate. The correlation between real interest rate and 
investment in every sector is expected to be negative. It means that the higher real 
interest rate will discourage the investment in every sector. Every sector should have 
different elasticity parameter of real interest rate on investment. This research would 
expect that more capital intensive industries are more sensitive to the change in interest 
rate compared to the labor-intensive industries. The capital-intensive industries need 
more funds to buy or rent more capital, and this fund depends on the interest rate.  
 The sectoral investment equation is expected to provide more accurate real 
interest rate elasticity on investment in each sector compared to if the policymakers use 
the aggregated national investment model.  
 
1.3 Literature Review 
 The commonly used approaches to explain investment namely the simple 
accelerator theory, flexible accelerator, Tobin’s Q theory associated with Tobin (1969), 
and neoclassical theory associated with Jorgenson (1963).  
The simple accelerator model formulation is based on Clark (1917). It assumes 
the desired capital-output ratio of the firms is constant.  
𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 = 𝑘𝑘𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 
Hence, the net investment is also proportional to the change in output: 
 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 − 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = 𝑘𝑘∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 (1.1) 
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where 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 is the output, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 is the capital stock, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 is the net investment, and 𝑘𝑘 is the 
desired capital-output ratio. The weakness of this model is due to the fact that the firms' 
response to the change of demand is always sufficient to keep the actual stock and the 
desired capital stock equal, which is not necessarily true. This theory ignores the 
influence on the cost of capital, the expectation of the investors, and profitability. 
Due to this problem, the model is reformulated into the flexible accelerator 
model by Goodwin (1948). This model is flexible because the investment can vary with 
other variables that related to market imperfection and uncertainty. Another feature of 
this model is the non-instantaneous adjustment to the desired capital stock. However, 
the model still lacks a solid theoretical foundation because the investment does not 
depend on the price of capital.  
In his paper, Jorgenson (1963) suggests an alternative to the accelerator model 
so-called a neoclassical model. It is derived by assuming the firms maximizes their 
profits subject to the Cobb-Douglas production function. Investment is calculated using 
the change of desired capital, which is a function of the user cost of capital, the level of 
output, and the price of output. In turn, this user cost of capital depends on the interest 
rate, depreciation rate, price of capital goods, and tax structure. 
 Theory of investment also developed by Tobin (1969) named the Tobin’s Q 
theory. In this theory, he introduced the Q ratio, which is the ratio of the existing capital 
and its replacement cost in terms of market value. The firms will increase their capital 
when the market value of the additional investment exceeds the replacement cost or 
when 𝑞𝑞 > 1. In this condition, the firms gain profits by investing more capital. On the 
other hand, when 𝑞𝑞 < 1, the expected investment are near zero because the profits 
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obtained from the additional investment are less than the cost of capital. The firms will 
maximize their expected present value to choose the investment level. The shadow price 
of capital, which is referred to the user cost of capital, is used to obtain the optimal 
value of capital stock. Capital stock will adjust until no more profit can be made, as the 
firms maximize their profit.  
There are some empirical studies conducted to understand the determinants of 
investment in both developed and developing countries focusing on different variables. 
Sakr (1993) examined the determinants of private investment in Pakistan for period 
1973/74 – 1991/92 annually. It found a positive correlation of private investment with 
GDP growth, the growth of credit to private sector and to government investment. If the 
government investment is divided into infrastructure and non-infrastructure 
components, private investment has a negative correlated with the non-infrastructure 
components. 
Another study from Dailami and Walton (1992) examined the determinant of 
private investment in Zimbabwe during 1970 until 1987. They used the lagged 
dependent variable, which is the lagged of investment, and used the growth of GNP, the 
real interest rate, the real effective exchange rate, the real wage, the relative price of 
capital goods, and the real UK government bond yields as the independent variables. 
The estimation results indicated that the private investment is positively correlated with 
the lagged of investment, the real interest rate, the growth of GNP, and the real effective 
exchange rate, and negatively associated with the real wage, the relative price of capital 
goods, and the real UK government bond yields. 
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Oshikoya (1994) tried to investigate the determinants of private investment in 
seven African countries from 1970 to 1988. The equation of private investment was 
estimated by ordinary least squares using separated pooled data for low-income 
countries namely Tanzania, Malawi, and Kenya, and for middle-income countries that 
are Tunisia, Marocco, Mauritius, and Cameroon. The estimation results found a positive 
impact of GDP growth rate on private investment. Overall, the most affecting variables 
on private investment in middle-income countries are the domestic inflation, the real 
exchange rate, the lagged debt service ratio, and the public investment rates. On the 
other hand, GDP growth, domestic inflation, credit to private sector, and debt service 
ratio are the largest affecting variables on private investment in low-income countries. 
Asante (2000) employed time series and cross-sectional analysis to study the 
determinants of private investment in Ghana during the period 1970 – 1992. The cross-
sectional analysis was used the primary data from the survey of 116 manufacturing 
firms. The survey was intended to capture certain variables, especially quantitative 
variables such as political instability, political uncertainty, etc., that may affect private 
investment but not introduced in the time series analysis. The study found that the 
growth of real credit to the private sector has a significant and positive effect on private 
investment. It also showed the complementary between private investment and public 
investment, so the development of infrastructure from the government is needed to 
boost the private sector. The others important variables that affect the private 
investment are macroeconomic instability, political instability, and the trade regime. 
Ajide and Lawanson (2012) in their paper tried to model the long-run 
determinants of domestic private investment in Nigeria from period 1970 to 2010. They 
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employed Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach. They 
found that the determinants between short-run and long-run are different. The key 
determinants in the short-run are real GDP, public investment, and terms of trade, while 
in the long-run the key determinants are real GDP, public investment, real interest rate, 
credit to the private sector, exchange rate, external debts, terms of trade, and reform 
dummy.  
Adugna (2013) examined and investigated factors that determine private 
investment in Ethiopia from 1981 to 2010. The author utilized OLS model on the 
logarithmic form of the data set. The results from the regression indicate that in the long 
run, private investment in Ethiopia depends positively and significantly on real GDP per 
capita, public investment, and external debt, while the lagged of private investment, as a 
proxy of the investment climate, has a significant negative impact on the private 
investment. In the short run, the external debt and real GDP per capita have a significant 
positive effect on the private investment, while the negative effect on private investment 
comes from inflation. 
The recent study by Elbanna (2016) investigated the determinants of private 
investment in Egypt as a developing country from period 1983 until 2014. The results 
of running the multiple regression shown that the private investment is affected by three 
determinants, namely GDP, money supply, and exchange rate. All of these are 
positively correlated with private investment. 
Only a few papers studied about investment in Indonesia. Suhendra and Anwar 
(2014), for example, their research tried to examine the effect of public investment by 
government and other macroeconomic variables like GDP growth, interest rate, 
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investment credit, inflation, and exchange rate on the private investment from 1990 to 
2011. It also investigated the effect of the private investment on the economic growth 
during that periods. The results indicated that investment positively associates with the 
economic growth, public investment, the availability of investment financing, and 
exchange rate. However, they found that interest rates, and inflation negatively affect 
the private investment. In the economic growth model, the key determinants of 
economic growth are private investment, human capital, public investment, and labor. 
They all positively correlated with the economic growth. 
Another research on the determinants of private investment in Indonesia was 
conducted by Nainggolan et al. (2015). They focus the analysis on North Sumatra 
Province using data from 1980 to 2011. The results from running Error Correction 
Model (ECM) method have shown that both in the short-run and long-run, the GDP, 
investment credit, and exchange rate have a significant and positive impact on private 
investment. However, the negative effect on private investment comes from the interest 
rate, government investment, inflation, and economic crisis. 
All of these research above mainly estimated the aggregated investment 
equation at national or regional level. The study on the sectoral investment is limited 
due to the lack of data availability. Bigsten, et al. (1997) examined the low levels of 
investment in the manufacturing sector in Africa. They conducted a survey of firms in 
the manufacturing sectors over the period 1992 to 1995 in four countries, namely 
Ghana, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. The sample was taken from four sub-sectors 
in the manufacturing, such as wood and furniture, textile and clothing, machinery and 
food, and metal working. As determinants of investment, they were focused on the 
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growth of value added, profitability, the size and the age of the firms, and past firms 
borrowing. The results from the panel data analysis suggested that the large firms are 
more likely to invest in any year than the small firms. They also argued that the crucial 
factor adversely affecting investment is the high capital costs facing the firms. 
The study about the determinants of agricultural sector investment in Bengkulu 
province in Indonesia was conducted by Tatiana, et al. (2015). They employed 
secondary data from Central Bureau of Statistics of Bengkulu from 2010 until 2013 
comprises of nine regencies: North Bengkulu, Central Bengkulu, South Bengkulu, 
Kepahiang, Rejang Lebong, Seluma, Lebong, Mukomuko, Kaur, and one city: 
Bengkulu city. The panel data regression was conducted. They found that the most 
dominant factors were GDP per capita, ownership of mining, road infrastructure, and 
agricultural resources. 
This chapter attempts to fill the gap by studying the sectoral investment in 
Indonesia comprehensively. It estimates all 20 sectoral investment equation in 
Indonesia. In addition, it also produces the aggregated national investment equation as a 
benchmark. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on the importance of having 
disaggregated sectoral investment model by comparing them to the aggregated national 
investment model, if we want to understand the impact of real interest rate on the 
sectoral investment. 
 
1.4 The Theoretical Framework 
 The proposed investment equation is derived using the neo-classical demand for 
capital. In this framework, the production function is formulated using constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) as; 
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 𝐹𝐹(𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎−1𝜎𝜎 + 𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜎𝜎−1𝜎𝜎 � 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎−1𝜈𝜈 ,         𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 1  (1.2) 
where 𝜎𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, 𝜈𝜈 denotes returns to 
scale, and 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 is total factor productivity. The user cost of capital (𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) equals to 
the first order condition of firm’s optimization problem with respect to capital, and 
hence leads to the following equality; 
 𝐹𝐹𝐾𝐾(𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (1.3) 
The first order conditions of firm profit maximizations are 
 log𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃 log𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎 log𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + log𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (1.4) 
or 
 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (1.5) 
where 𝜃𝜃 = �𝜎𝜎 + 1−𝜎𝜎
𝜈𝜈
� and ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = log �(𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝜎𝜎−1𝜈𝜈 (𝜈𝜈𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖)𝜎𝜎� 
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is log of capital stock, 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the log of user cost of capital, ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the log of firm 
specific variables, and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the log of output or sales. 
 In this study, equation (1.5) is estimated using the new specification in terms of 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL).  The dynamic neoclassical investment 
model in ARDL(1,0) is defined as follows; 
 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜔𝜔1𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎1𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙1ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (1.6) 
 By taking first difference of equation (1.6) and using the approximation log𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 −log𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1⁄ − 𝛿𝛿, and replacing year-specific productivity growth (Δ log𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡) by 
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time dummies (𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡), and also replacing firm-specific effects productivity growth 
(Δ log𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) by firm-specific effects (𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖), and adding a random term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, yields; 
 �
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1� = 𝜔𝜔1 � 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2� + 𝜃𝜃1Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜎𝜎1Δ𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (1.7) 
Based on the neoclassical model, one of the main factors for determining the 
user cost of capital is the interest rate. The higher the interest rate, the higher the user 
cost of capital and vice versa. Thus, the monetary policy transmission through the 
traditional interest rate channel can be explained by the user cost of capital. The most 
commonly used user cost of capital in the previous studies is based on Jorgenson (1967) 
approach. The derivation is as follows: 
 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 = � 𝑒𝑒−(𝑟𝑟+𝛿𝛿)(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)∞
𝑠𝑠
𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 (1.8) 
where 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 denotes competitive equilibrium price of capital or equals to the series of 
discounted user cost, and 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 represents the user cost which is the value of capital 
service at time t. The differentiation of this equation with respect to time s yields the 
user cost of capital; 
 𝜎𝜎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠(𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝜋𝜋) (1.9) 
From this expression, the user cost of capital can be defined as a function of the price of 
capital, real interest rate, and depreciation. By combining equation (1.7) and (1.9), the 
investment equation can be formulated as a function of lagged investment, GDP growth, 
and real interest rate.    
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1.5 Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
The concept of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) has been increasingly 
popular since last two decades. This section will discuss the basic concept of GMM 
before further discussion the dynamic panel data estimator, particularly the Arellano-
Bond Estimator. Most of the dynamic panel data estimators are based on the idea of 
GMM.  
 Let define a linear model: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖′𝜹𝜹 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖             (𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑛𝑛) (1.10) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is an independent variable, 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖 is and a vector of regressors with L-dimension, 
𝜹𝜹 is a coefficient of regressors with L-dimension, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is an error term. Let 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 be a K-
dimensional vector of instruments. 
The fundamental principle of the method of moments is to find the parameter 
estimate such that the associated sample moments is equal to zero. Let 𝐸𝐸[𝒈𝒈(𝜹𝜹)] denotes 
the population moments in the orthogonality conditions. The sample moments then can 
be obtained by calculating the sample mean of 𝒈𝒈(𝜹𝜹) evaluated at some hypothetical 
value 𝜹𝜹� of 𝜹𝜹, or  
 𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹�� ≡
1
𝑛𝑛
�𝒈𝒈�𝜹𝜹��
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (1.11) 
Using the method of moments to the model actually solves the K number of 
equations in L unknowns such that 𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹�� = 𝟎𝟎. Since the model is linear, 𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹�� is 
written as 
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𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹�� ≡
1
𝑛𝑛
�𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖
′𝜹𝜹��
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
             = 1
𝑛𝑛
�𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
− �
1
𝑛𝑛
�𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖
′� 𝜹𝜹� ≡ 𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛𝜹𝜹� 
(1.12) 
where 𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 and 𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛 are the sample moments of 𝝈𝝈𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 and 𝚺𝚺𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙: 
𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 ≡
1
𝑛𝑛
�𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
      𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑       𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛 = 1𝑛𝑛�𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖
′ 
Therefore, the 𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹�� = 𝟎𝟎 condition can be written as 
 𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛𝜹𝜹� = 𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 (1.13) 
In the case of 𝐾𝐾 > 𝐿𝐿, the system may not have a solution. The extension of the method 
of moments known as GMM is used. 
 In the overidentified equation, when 𝐾𝐾 > 𝐿𝐿, there is no L-dimension of 𝜹𝜹� that 
satisfy the K-equations in (1.13), so the 𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹�� cannot set exactly equal to zero. In this 
situation, we try to find 𝜹𝜹� such that 𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹�� is close to zero by introducing the weighting 
matrix, 𝑾𝑾�, which is a positive definite and symmetric matrix, in the objective function 
of GMM. The GMM estimator of 𝜹𝜹� is 
 𝜹𝜹
��𝑾𝑾�� ≡ argmin
𝜹𝜹�
𝐽𝐽�𝜹𝜹�,𝑾𝑾�� (1.14) 
where 
𝐽𝐽�𝜹𝜹�,𝑾𝑾�� ≡ 𝑛𝑛.𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹��′𝑾𝑾�𝒈𝒈𝑛𝑛�𝜹𝜹�� 
 In the linear model, the objective function is quadratic in 𝜹𝜹�: 
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 𝐽𝐽�𝜹𝜹�,𝑾𝑾�� = 𝑛𝑛. �𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛𝜹𝜹��′𝑾𝑾��𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 − 𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛𝜹𝜹�� (1.15) 
The first order condition for the minimization problem with respect to 𝜹𝜹� can be written 
as follows: 
 𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛′ 𝑾𝑾�𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 = 𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛′ 𝑾𝑾�𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛𝜹𝜹� (1.16) 
Finally, the GMM estimation can be obtained by solving 𝜹𝜹� as follows: 
 𝜹𝜹��𝑾𝑾�� = �𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛′ 𝑾𝑾�𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛�−1𝑺𝑺𝒙𝒙𝒛𝒛′ 𝑾𝑾�𝒔𝒔𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 (1.17) 
This estimator will reduce to the IV-estimator when 𝐾𝐾 = 𝐿𝐿. 
1.5.1 The Arellano-Bond Estimator 
The panel GMM estimator suggested in Arellano and Bond (1991) has become 
more popular for estimating dynamic data panels. It is because the Arellano-Bond 
estimator gives consistent estimates in panels with short time series observations per 
individual or small T, and relies on minimal assumptions, but it needs large samples of 
the cross-section dimension, or large N. This estimator is similar to the Anderson and 
Hsiao estimator1. However, it utilizes additional moment restrictions, that enhance the 
instrument set. 
The model specification in level is 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ 𝜷𝜷 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (1.18) 
The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator uses the differenced form of the original 
equation 
                                                 
1 See Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
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 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝜌𝜌�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2� + �𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ − 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1′ �𝜷𝜷 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (1.19) 
This will cancel the individual fixed effects that assumed to correlate with the 
exogenous variable. In the matrix notation, we can write both equations above as 
follows: 
 𝒙𝒙 = 𝒙𝒙−1𝜌𝜌 + 𝑿𝑿𝜷𝜷 + 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 + 𝜺𝜺 (1.20) 
 𝑭𝑭𝒙𝒙 = 𝑭𝑭𝒙𝒙−1𝜌𝜌 + 𝑭𝑭𝑿𝑿𝜷𝜷 + 𝑭𝑭𝜺𝜺 (1.21) 
where  
𝑭𝑭 = 𝑰𝑰𝑁𝑁 ⊗ 𝑭𝑭𝑇𝑇 and 𝑭𝑭𝑇𝑇 = �−1 1 0 … 0 00 −1 1 … 0 0⋮0 0 0 … −1 1�   with (𝑇𝑇 − 1)×𝑇𝑇 dimension 
The individual fixed effects cancel out because 𝑭𝑭𝑫𝑫 = 𝟎𝟎. However, the error term, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 , clearly correlated with the lagged of endogenous variable, 𝐸𝐸�𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� ≠ 0. 
Thus, the estimator will be biased. 
  Anderson and Hsiao argued that employing the lags 2 of level instruments or 
lags 2 of difference as an instrument or the lags of difference endogenous regressor can 
address this problem. This is because these instruments are expected to be uncorrelated 
with the differenced error term: 
𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� = 0 and 𝐸𝐸�𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� = 0 
 However, Arellano (1989) found that using level instruments is beneficial than 
using difference instruments since there are no points of singularities and the variance is 
small. In addition, the advantage of using level instruments is having one year less of 
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losing data. This is relevant in practical use when using few years with a large number 
of individuals. 
 For 𝑑𝑑 = 3, the equation (1.19) is written as 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖3 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2 = 𝜌𝜌(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1) + (𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖3′ − 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖2′ )𝜷𝜷 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖3 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2 (1.22) 
In this example, the available instruments are 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1,𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖2′ , and 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖1′ . 
At final period T, the equation becomes 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−1 = 𝜌𝜌�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−2� + �𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇′ − 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−1′ �𝜷𝜷 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−1 (1.23) 
the available instruments are 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,1,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,2, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−2,𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖1′ ,𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖2′ , …𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−1′ . 
The instrumented equation in matrix notation is 
 𝑾𝑾′𝑭𝑭𝒙𝒙 = 𝑾𝑾′𝑭𝑭𝑿𝑿𝑭𝑭 + 𝑾𝑾′𝑭𝑭𝜺𝜺 (1.24) 
where 
𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖3 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2
⋮
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−2
𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖3
′ − 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖2
′
𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖4
′ − 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖3
′
⋮
𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇
′ − 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−1′ ⎦⎥
⎥
⎤
 
𝑿𝑿 = (𝒙𝒙−1,𝑿𝑿),    𝑭𝑭′ = (𝜌𝜌,𝜷𝜷′),    𝑾𝑾 = (𝑾𝑾1′ ,𝑾𝑾2′ , … ,𝑾𝑾𝑁𝑁′ )′ 
𝑾𝑾𝑖𝑖 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
[𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1′ , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2′ ] 0 … 00 [𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1′ , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2′ ,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖3′ ] … 00 0 ⋱ 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋮0 0 ⋯ �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖2, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−2,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1′ , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖2′ , … , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇−1′ �⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
The maximal number of parameters estimated in the K-explanatory variable is 
𝑇𝑇 − 2 + 𝐾𝐾(𝑇𝑇 − 1). The estimation procedure consists of a two-step estimation as in the 
simple instrumental variable estimation. The first step of estimation utilizes a 
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covariance matrix to take into account the first order autocorrelation in the error term 
which is introduced by the differencing operation. 
 𝑽𝑽 = 𝑾𝑾′𝑮𝑮𝑾𝑾 = �𝑾𝑾𝑖𝑖′𝑮𝑮𝑇𝑇𝑾𝑾𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 (1.25) 
where 𝑮𝑮 = (𝑰𝑰𝑁𝑁 ⊗ 𝑮𝑮𝑇𝑇′ ) and 𝑮𝑮𝑇𝑇 = 𝑭𝑭𝑇𝑇𝑭𝑭𝑇𝑇′ = � 2 −1 0−1 2 ⋱⋱ ⋱ −10 −1 2 � 
The transformation from the original observations into differences is obtained by 
multiplying the matrix 𝑭𝑭. The covariance matrix 𝑽𝑽 = 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭′ is used as the approximation 
of the covariance matrix in the first-step, because the variance of error term in 
difference equation is 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟(𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭) = 𝑭𝑭𝜎𝜎2𝑭𝑭′. 
The second step of GMM estimation utilizes the residuals of the first-step 
estimation in order to estimate the covariance matrix: 
 𝑽𝑽� = �𝑾𝑾𝑖𝑖′𝑭𝑭𝑇𝑇𝜺𝜺�𝑖𝑖𝜺𝜺�𝑖𝑖′𝑭𝑭𝑇𝑇′ 𝑾𝑾𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 (1.26) 
Finally, the estimator is 
 𝑭𝑭�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = �𝑿𝑿′𝑾𝑾𝑽𝑽�−1𝑾𝑾′𝑿𝑿�−1𝑿𝑿′𝑾𝑾𝑽𝑽�−1𝑾𝑾′𝒙𝒙 (1.27) 
1.5.2 Instrument Validation 
The validity of instrument must be checked after the estimation parameters are 
conducted. There are two types of instrument validation: 
• The validity of instrument subsets is verified by the Sargan test (Sargan 1958). 
The null hypothesis of this test is “the instruments as a group are exogenous or 
 20 
 
uncorrelated with the residuals.” The validity of instruments is obtained when 
this hypothesis in not rejected. Thus, the higher p-value of the Sargan statistic 
the better.  In the two-step robust estimation, the Hansen J-statistic is used 
instead of the Sargan statistic. The null hypothesis of the Hansen J-statistic is the 
same as in the Sargan. 
• To investigate the serial correlation in the disturbance, the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) suggests a test. The validity of instruments can be checked from the 
existence of serial correlation in the disturbances. When 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 are serially 
correlated of order 1, the 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 is endogenous or correlated to Δ𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 because 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 presents in the difference. Thus, we cannot use 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 as a valid 
instrument. 
Arellano and Bond tested the serial correlation of disturbance using difference, 
Δ𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, instead of level 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. The serial correlation of order 2 in difference must be 
tested to check the serial correlation of order 1 in levels. The validation of 
instrumental variables is achieved when the null hypothesis of this test (no serial 
correlation) is not rejected. 
   
1.6 Data and Methodology 
Most of the data are gathered from CEIC Indonesian premium database. The 
model used GDP by industry and GDP by expenditure for every province to extract 
investment by industry for every province. This data is annually from 2000 to 2013. 
Thus, the panel dataset consists of larger province dimension (N=33) and shorter time 
dimension (T=14).  
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The investment for every sector is estimated using dynamic panel data across 
provinces since the period of the dataset is too short. The variables used as regressor in 
the model are private domestic investment (in logarithmic) 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; real GDP growth, 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡; and real interest rate, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡. The index i indicates the sectoral variables. There are 
four exogenous instrument variables: 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, that is loan given by commercial and 
rural banks; 𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, which is broad money in the percentage of GDP; 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
which is domestic credit provided by financial sector in the percentage of GDP; and 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡, that is ratio of M3 to M1 as a proxy of financial innovation. Meanwhile, the 
pre-determined instruments are: the lagged of investment; GDP level, denoted by 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗; deflator of investment, denoted by 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗, as a proxy of capital price; 
and the lagged of real interest rate. These pre-determined instruments are all in level 
instead of in difference. However, every sector is estimated using different combination 
of exogenous and pre-determined instruments that are mentioned above.  
The model is formulated as follow: 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1.28) 
The Arellano – Bond GMM estimator is used because some econometric 
problems may arise when estimating the equation above, namely: 
1) There might be causality between 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 from both directions 
since 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is assumed to be endogenous. These regressors might be 
correlated with error term. 
2) The explanatory variables might be correlated with the time-invariant 
province characteristics (fixed effects), such as demographics and 
geography.  
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3) The lagged dependent variable, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, that was introduced in the model 
might give rise to the correlation of this variable with error term.  
4) The dataset of the panel has a short time dimension (T =14) and a larger 
region dimension (N =33). 
The first problem can be solved by introducing not only the exogenous 
instruments but also the lagged levels of the endogenous regressors. Therefore, the 
endogenous variables are pre-determined and not correlated with the error term.  
The second problem can be addressed using the difference GMM by 
transforming equation (1.28) into the first difference equation: 
 Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽1Δ𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2Δ𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + Δ𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1.29) 
The first difference transformation removes the fixed province-specific effect because it 
is constant over time.  
 The correlation of first-differenced lagged dependent variable Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 with the 
error term in problem 3 can also be coped by introducing the instruments of its past 
levels, i.e. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−3, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−4, etc. 
 The fourth problem is solved using the Arellano and Bond estimator because it 
was designed to deal with the small-T and large-N panels. 
 All these problems above can be addressed by implementing the Arellano and 
Bond with difference GMM estimator. Moreover, the two-step robust estimation 
process is also used to make the resulting standard errors are consistent with panel-
specific autocorrelation and heterogeneity in one-step estimation. 
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1.7 Estimation Results 
Due to the limited number of provinces in the panel dataset, it is necessary to keep 
the number of instruments less than or equal to the number of provinces or groups. The 
second lag or deeper lags are required because they are not correlated with the current 
error term, but the first lag is. To find a good instrument, one can experiment with 
second or deeper lags. However, they will reduce the sample size using deeper lags. As 
long as the number of instruments less than or equal to the number of groups, one can 
use all available lags (second and deeper lags) as instruments. 
As mentioned before, every sectoral equation is estimated using a different 
combination of exogenous instruments. Table 1.1 below, shows the combination of 
exogenous and predetermined instruments that are used for estimation at sectoral and 
national level including the total number of instruments. As shown, the total number of 
instruments including predetermined and exogenous is less than or equal to the 
maximum number of group or province, which is 33.   
Before we discuss the estimation results, it is better to check the validity of 
instruments so that the parameters are not biased. As mentioned in the instrument 
validation section above, we have to make sure that the estimation results passed those 
two types of validation. First, the Hansen test should tell that the null hypothesis is not 
rejected because in this paper we used the two-step robust estimation, so the Sargan test 
is not relevant in this case. This condition indicates the instruments are exogenous or 
uncorrelated with the residuals. Second, the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences should also reject the null hypothesis to show that there is no serial 
correlation of order 1 in levels. 
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Table 1.1  List of Instrument Variables 
 
Sector Descriptions 
List of Instruments Total 
Number 
of Instru-
ments 
Predetermined Exogenous 
fcrops Food Crops 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡−4, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 
23 
nfcrop Non-Food 
Crops 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡−4,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡−4,  𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 
32 
lvstck Livestock 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−3,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−3 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 24 
forest Forestry 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−5,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−5 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 
30 
fish Fishery 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠ℎ,𝑡𝑡−4,  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠ℎ,𝑡𝑡−4, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−4 
 
𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 32 
oilmq Oil, Gas and 
Geothermal 
Mining 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑡−7,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑡−8 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 15 
noilm
q 
Non-Oil and 
Gas and Other 
Mining 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑡−7, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−7, 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑡𝑡−8, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−8  𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡   29 
oilmf Oil and Gas 
Manufacturing 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−8 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 8 
noilmf Non-Oil and 
Gas 
Manufacturing 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−4,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 23 
utili Electricity, Gas 
and Drinking 
Water 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−4,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−4 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 22 
const Construction 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−4,  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−5, 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−6 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 31 
trade Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡−4, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−4 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 24 
hotel Hotel and 
Restaurant 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−5,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−5 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 22 
lndtrn Land 
Transportation 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−7,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−8 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 16 
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Sector Descriptions 
List of Instruments Total 
Number 
of Instru-
ments 
Predetermined Exogenous 
wtrtrn Water 
Transportation 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−9,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−9, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−9,  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−10,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−10, 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−10 
𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 29 
airtrn Air 
Transportation 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−4,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−4, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−4 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , 
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 
33 
comm
u 
Communication
s 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡−4,  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡−5, 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡−6 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 31 
finan Financial, 
Ownership and 
Business 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−7,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−7, 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−8,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−8, 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 
29 
pubsrv Public Services 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 24 
othsrv Other Services 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−4,  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡−4, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−4 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 32 
nat Aggregated 
National 
Investment 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−5,  
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡−5, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−5 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑀𝑀2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 31 
 
 Table 1.2 shows the estimation result of aggregated national investment 
equation using dynamic panel data. The overidentified restrictions test using Hansen 
and difference in Hansen test of exogeneity are satisfactory, which means the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error process. In addition, Arellano-Bond test for 
second-order autoregression, written as AR(2), in first-differences indicated the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. In other words, there is no serial correlation of order 1 
in levels.  
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Table 1.2  Estimation Results of Aggregated National Investment Equation 
 
Variables National   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 1.004 *** 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 1.17 * 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 -0.35 * 
      
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in 1st differences -1.88 * 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 1st differences -1.25   
Hansen test of overid restrictions 30.39   
Difference-in-Hansen test of Exogeneity 1.46   
*,**,*** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
As shown, the determinants of aggregated investment at national level are the 
lagged of investment, GDP growth and real interest rate because they are significantly 
correlated with aggregated national investment. The coefficient of lagged investment is 
positive and significant at 1% with a coefficient of 1.004. The coefficient of GDP 
growth is also positive at 1.17 as expected and significant at 10%. In contrast, the real 
interest rate elasticity of investment is -0.35, which is significant and negative as 
expected. The negative coefficient of real interest rate on aggregated national 
investment means that the higher real interest rate will discourage the national 
investment. 
To make the real interest rate coefficient comparable, the sectoral investment 
equations are estimated using the disaggregated investment data and utilizing the same 
model and method of estimation as in aggregated national investment equation. Table 
1.3 below show the estimation results of sectoral investment equation for every sector. 
In term of the validity of the instruments, the Hansen test of overidentified restriction 
and the difference in Hansen test of exogeneity indicate that there is no correlation 
between instruments and error term. The Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
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differences also proves that there is no serial correlation of order 1 in levels. Therefore, 
the estimation process in every sector has used valid instruments.   
Table 1.3  Estimation Results of Sectoral Investment Equation  
 
Variables Food Crop  Non-Food Crop  Livestock  Forestry  Fishery  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 1.03 *** 1.01 *** 0.99 *** 0.92 *** 1.02 *** 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 1.36 * 1.35 ** 2.10 ** 1.32 *** 1.32 *** 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 -0.24 ** -0.39 ** -0.32 *** -0.51 ** -0.30 ** 
                      
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(1) in 1st 
differences -2.14 ** -2.22 ** -2.22 ** -2.34 ** -2.45 ** 
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in 1st 
differences -1.30   -1.25   -1.19   -1.20   -1.38   
Hansen test of 
overid restrictions 19.61   27.09   20.98   30.01   23.39   
Difference-in-
Hansen test of 
Exogeneity 2.98   1.33   1.31   4.68   1.33   
 
Variables Oil Mining Non-Oil Mining Oil Manuf. 
 Non-Oil 
Manuf. Utility 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 0.97 *** 0.99 *** 0.87 *** 1.0005 *** 1.02 *** 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 0.76 *** 0.97 *** 0.65 * 1.18 *** 0.87 *** 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 -0.31 ** -0.27 ** -0.66 ** -0.35 ** -0.38 ** 
                      
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(1) in 1st 
differences -1.10   -2.12 ** -1.51   -2.13 ** -2.25 ** 
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in 1st 
differences -1.16   -1.40   -1.00   -1.32   -1.39   
Hansen test of 
overid restrictions 14.37   22.55   5.53   26.51   26.51   
Difference-in-
Hansen test of 
Exogeneity 1.25   0.73   4.49   4.22   0.36   
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Variables Cons-truction Trade Hotel 
 Land 
Transp. 
Water 
Transp. 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 1.002 *** 1.003 *** 0.99 *** 0.98 *** 0.94 *** 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 1.17 ** 1.55 * 1.58 *** 2.42 ** 0.79 *** 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 -0.49 ** -0.22 * -0.28 ** -0.32 ** -0.35 ** 
                      
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(1) in 1st 
differences -2.17 ** -2.10 ** -2.11 ** -2.15 ** -2.49 ** 
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in 1st 
differences -1.29   -1.37   -1.41   -1.19   -1.63   
Hansen test of 
overid restrictions 29.43   20.66   21.08   13.99   29.08   
Difference-in-
Hansen test of 
Exogeneity 5.03   2.55   1.69   4.03   2.14   
 
Variables Air Transp. 
Communi-
cation Finance 
Public 
Service 
Other 
Service 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 1.006 *** 1.01 *** 1.01 *** 1.02 *** 1.0001 *** 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 0.95 *** 1.67 *** 1.22 ** 1.11 ** 1.51 ** 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 -0.32 * -0.56 ** -0.26 ** -0.23 ** -0.38 ** 
                      
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(1) in 1st 
differences -2.14 ** -2.17 ** -2.03 ** -2.15 ** -2.43 ** 
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in 1st 
differences -1.37   -1.28   -1.26   -1.39   -1.34   
Hansen test of 
overid restrictions 28.54   31.81   27.66   19.99   30.35   
Difference-in-
Hansen test of 
Exogeneity 1.04   1.22   0.09   1.27   2.54   
*,**,*** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
As can be seen, the lagged of investment, the sectoral real GDP growth and the 
real interest rate are the important factors that determine the investment in every sector. 
The same as in the aggregated investment estimation, the first two factors are positively 
and significantly correlated with sectoral investment. The elasticity parameter of lagged 
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investment and sectoral real GDP growth show that today investment decisions strongly 
depend on the last year investment and the current sectoral economic condition which is 
proxied by sectoral real GDP growth. On the other hand, the last factor has a significant 
negative impact on the investment in each sector. 
From Table 1.3, we can argue that the most affected sector by the change in real 
interest rate is oil and gas manufacturing with the elasticity of real interest rate on the 
investment around -0.66. Moreover, the least affected sector is wholesale and retail 
trade sector with the coefficient of real interest rate on the investment about -0.22.  
In order to compare the elasticity of real interest rate on investment for each 
sector between aggregated investment model and sectoral investment model, we need to 
use the weighted elasticities by multiplying the real interest rate elasticities with the 
contribution of sectoral investment on the total investment as described in Table 1.4 
below.  
In the aggregated investment model, the only way to determine the most 
affected sector to the change of real interest rate is by looking at the weighted elasticity 
of real interest rate on investment. According to this approach, Non-Oil and Gas 
Manufacturing, and Trade sectors are the two sectors that contribute the most to the 
total investment. Therefore, these two sectors are highly sensitive to the change in real 
interest rate. However, this approach is biased and does not tell the real story on how 
the actual real interest rate affects the sectoral investment. It is because the actual results 
from the sectoral investment model showed that the most affected sector to the change 
in real interest rate is Oil and Gas Manufacturing. 
 
 30 
 
 
Table 1.4  Contributions of Sectoral Investment on Total Investment as of 2013 
 
No Sector Contribution 
1 Non-Oil and Gas Manufacturing 19.93% 
2 Trade 17.80% 
3 Finance 11.08% 
4 Construction 6.93% 
5 Food Crop 5.35% 
6 Communications 5.29% 
7 Other Services 4.95% 
8 Public Services 4.86% 
9 Hotel and Restaurant 3.72% 
10 Oil, Gas and Geothermal Mining 3.67% 
11 
Non-Oil and Gas and Other 
Mining 3.29% 
12 Non-Food Crop 2.94% 
13 Land Transportation 2.48% 
14 Fishery 1.74% 
15 Livestock 1.48% 
16 Oil and Gas Manufacturing 1.40% 
17 
Electricity, Gas and Drinking 
Water 0.98% 
18 Air Transportation 0.80% 
19 Water Transportation 0.67% 
20 Forestry 0.63% 
  Total 100% 
   Source: author compilation from CEIC data 
The comparison between those two models on how the change of real interest 
rate affects the sectoral investment is described in Table 1.5 below. As seen in that 
table, the weighted real interest rate elasticities between aggregated nation investment 
model and sectoral investment model are very different. Some elasticities in the sectoral 
investment model are higher, some others are lower compared to those in the 
aggregated national investment model. 
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This implies the different implications of using aggregated data and using 
disaggregated data. In this exercise, it is clear that the information that we get from the 
aggregated investment estimation is misleading. Thus, the policymakers should not rely 
on the aggregated investment estimation if they want to understand how their policy 
affects the investment in each sector. 
Table 1.5  The comparison of the coefficient of real interest rate on sectoral investment 
 
No Sector 
The Real 
Interest 
Rate 
Elasticity 
from 
Sectoral 
Model 
The 
Weighted 
Real Interest 
Rate 
Elasticity 
from Sectoral 
Investment 
Model  
The Weighted 
Real Interest 
Rate Elasticity 
from 
Aggregated 
National Model  
1 Oil and Gas Manufacturing -0.658 -0.00923 -0.00491 
2 Communications -0.563 -0.02980 -0.01852 
3 Forestry -0.508 -0.00320 -0.00221 
4 Construction -0.487 -0.03375 -0.02424 
5 Non Food Crop -0.386 -0.01137 -0.01031 
6 Other Services -0.382 -0.01890 -0.01732 
7 
Electricity, Gas and Drinking 
Water -0.380 -0.00374 -0.00344 
8 Non-Oil and Gas Manufacturing -0.352 -0.07015 -0.06976 
9 Water Transportation -0.346 -0.00232 -0.00235 
10 Land Transportation -0.325 -0.00805 -0.00868 
11 Air Transportation -0.316 -0.00252 -0.00279 
12 Livestock -0.315 -0.00468 -0.00519 
13 Oil, Gas and Geothermal Mining -0.308 -0.01129 -0.01284 
14 Fishery -0.295 -0.00514 -0.00609 
15 Hotel and Restaurant -0.281 -0.01043 -0.01301 
16 Non-Oil and Gas and Other Mining -0.274 -0.00904 -0.01153 
17 Financial, Ownership and Business -0.259 -0.02867 -0.03878 
18 Food Crop -0.242 -0.01296 -0.01872 
19 Public Services -0.231 -0.01120 -0.01701 
20 Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.217 -0.03863 -0.06230 
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Since the central bank’s policy instrument is the nominal interest rate, not the 
real interest rate, in the end, the impact of the policy on the sectoral investment depends 
on how a central bank controls the inflation level so that the real interest rate can be 
managed at desired level for the investment. 
 
1.8 Conclusion 
The current studies about the determinant of investment in Indonesia are limited 
to the national level, regional specific or sectoral specific in a particular region. There 
are no comprehensive studies on sectoral investment in Indonesia. This research 
attempts to fill this gap by estimating an individual investment equation of 20 sectors in 
Indonesia and then compare them with the aggregated national investment equation as a 
benchmark model in term of weighted elasticities. 
This chapter successfully estimates both national aggregated and sectoral 
investment equations using dynamic panel estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond. 
This estimator argues to be most suitable method given the characteristics of the panel 
data set and the investment equation as discussed in the previous section. 
 The estimation results showed that both in the national aggregated and sectoral 
investment equations, lagged investment, GDP growth, and real interest rate 
significantly affect the investment in Indonesia. As expected, lagged investment and 
GDP growth positively affect investment since they promote a conducive investment 
environment. On the other hand, the real interest rate has a negative impact on 
investment since the cost of capital increases along with the rise of real interest rate. 
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 Given the current available national aggregated investment equation, the easiest 
method to determine the most affected sector to the change of real interest rate is by 
multiplying the estimated parameters with the sectoral contribution to the national 
economy. From this approach, we found that the most affected sector by the change in 
real interest rate is Non-Oil and Gas Manufacturing sector. However, if we compare 
those results with the results from the sectoral investment equations, the most affected 
sector on the change of real interest rate is Oil and Gas Manufacturing sector. This 
finding is very different from the previous method.  
In terms of the weighted real interest rate coefficient, the results from the 
aggregated national investment equation and the sectoral investment equation are very 
different. These differences are quite large, so it is important to have sectoral 
investment model to understand the impact of real interest rate on investment. 
In summary, running the aggregated national investment and then using the 
sectoral contribution to obtain the weighted sectoral elasticity of real interest rate on the 
sectoral investment can give the policymakers wrong answers. It is better to use the 
coefficient of real interest rate on sectoral investment taken from the sectoral investment 
estimation. This discrepancy can be problematic when it goes to the policymakers, 
especially central bank as a monetary authority because the policy implication is 
different in both magnitude of the interest rate policy and the target sector. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE COORDINATION OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY IN 
REGIONAL ECONOMY: THE CASE OF INDONESIA 
 
2.1 Background 
Indonesia which is located in the South-East Asian is the largest archipelago 
country in the world comprising approximately 17,508 islands. It spans over 5,000 km 
from west to east (equals to the United States) and about 1,900 km from north to south. 
This geographic condition creates many problems for Indonesia. Two of them are the 
uneven distribution of growth across the regions and rising inequality concern. 
In common situation, the Indonesian policymakers such as a central bank as a 
monetary authority and government as a fiscal authority usually only take into account 
the national macro variables as an indicator to see the impact of their policy such as 
national GDP growth, national inflation, national income inequality and etc. They have 
limitations to analyze the impact of their policy to the regional economy since the 
national macroeconomic model is the only option to do the analysis. Even though they 
have a regional macroeconomic model, the common model to do the analysis is using 
an econometric method which cannot be used to analyze the impact of the policy 
comprehensively because the model is categorized as partial equilibrium model. In 
partial equilibrium model, we always assume that all variables outside the model are 
exogenous, including and in particular inter-regional trade. The exogeneity assumptions 
might be inappropriate if for instance we are interested in the interactions between as 
well as within the Indonesian regions. 
In the simple textbook, monetary policy has the same effect on the national 
economy. However, this is not true in reality. A country like Indonesia with many 
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regions that are linked might have different respond to the changing of economic 
circumstances. For example, the crude oil price hike in July 2008 affected energy-
producing regions very differently from energy-consuming regions. Thus, my argument 
here that monetary policy has differential effects because of structural differences across 
regions. 
Based on Carlino and Defina (1995), at least there are three reasons from 
economic theory that support that idea. First, the differences in interest-sensitive 
industries across regions. Every industry will act differently to the change in interest 
rate. The capital-intensive industries are likely to be more interest-sensitive than labor-
intensive industries since they need more fund to buy or rent capital and this fund 
depends on the level of interest rate. Second, the different ability of the bank to alter 
their balance sheets across regions. The ability of banks to make the loan as an effect of 
the change in interest rate are varied. Small banks have limited funding option than 
large banks. Therefore, the regions in which the large share of bank loans are made by 
small banks might be more sensitive to the monetary policy than regions in which the 
large share of bank loan is made by large banks. Third, the mix of small and large 
borrower across regions. The difference between a number of small borrowers and large 
borrower and the source of credit could be the reason for the different response of 
monetary policy. Some borrowers might have difficulties in obtaining credit from banks 
as the only source of funds. On the other hand, large borrowers usually have many 
alternative sources of funds from non-banks. As a result, regions with high 
concentration of large borrowers should be less sensitive to the level of interest rate than 
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those with a high concentration of small borrowers. In literature, we can interpret 
borrowers’ size as firms’ size. 
 Ridhwan et al. (2014) using a VAR model found that monetary policy between 
1990 and 2007 had considerably different effects across the 26 Indonesian provinces. 
The most affected province by an unanticipated one percent point increase in monetary 
policy is West Java, the largest manufacturing-based province and the least affected 
province is Bali. In general, Java Island which is dominated by manufacturing industry 
is more sensitive to the change in monetary policy than Sulawesi and Eastern Indonesia 
which are highly dependent on the agriculture sector. Their study also supports the 
economic theory regarding the importance of cross-regional industrial composition 
(proxied by the share of manufacturing), bank size and firm size in explaining the 
differential responses to monetary policy. 
 In the context of fiscal policy, the government has more flexibility to give a 
stimulus to particular regions compared to the central bank through its interest rate 
policy. The stimulus can be given to the local government in the particular region that is 
affected by the shocks. However, the interest rate policy can only be implemented 
nationally. When negative shocks hit the economy, both the central bank and 
government must work together to address the problem. In Indonesia, the central bank 
and government at national and regional level have been collaborating through the 
existing coordination forums such as inflation target stipulation forum, Bank Indonesia 
Governor council coordination meeting with the government, national inflation 
controlling team, and regional inflation controlling team. In these forums, the tool that 
can capture the local government stimulus in the particular region and the differential 
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effect of monetary policy on each region is needed, so that they can simulate their 
policies given the current shocks to come up with the right combination of policies. 
For these reasons, it is very important to build the general equilibrium model for 
the regional economy so the policy makers can analyze the implication of proposed 
policy recommendation to the regional economy. The model is the extension of 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model by employing Inter-Regional Social 
Accounting Matrix (IRSAM) that has regional dimension combined with Financial 
Social Accounting Matrix (FSAM) which has a financial sector. The inclusion of this 
financial sector will give more realistic condition to the economy. 
The objective of this study is to build the comprehensive tool for analyzing the 
impact of shocks and/or policies not only in national economy but also in the regional 
economy in more detail including real and financial sector in the economy, namely 
Financial Inter-Regional Computable General Equilibrium Model (FIRCGE) model. In 
addition, this paper also analyzes on how central bank as a monetary authority and 
government as a fiscal authority should coordinate in order to achieve specific objective 
given the specific shocks. Moreover, this study wants to compare the effectiveness of 
the combination of interest rate and different fiscal stimulus rule, which are a untargeted 
fiscal stimulus and targeted fiscal stimulus. The detailed explanation of this regulation 
will be discussed in analysis and simulation section.  We will use the backdrop of the 
world oil price reduction in 2015 and 2016 to demonstrate how the FIRCGE model 
addresses these questions above. 
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2.2 Hypothesis 
 The impact of world oil price reduction should affect each region differently 
depending on the characteristics of each region. The region with high oil production 
will suffer more from this shock than the others. Moreover, FIRCGE can generate the 
iso-loss curve that can be helpful for central bank and government to coordinate and 
give a picture on the tradeoff between interest rate and fiscal stimulus. Lastly, the 
combination of monetary policy and targeted fiscal stimulus should be more effective 
than the combination with the untargeted fiscal stimulus.   
 
2.3 Literature Review 
 The basic idea behind the CGE model is the interconnection between all markets 
in the economy that was proposed by Leon Walras (1834-1910). In the classic general 
equilibrium theory of Arrow and Hahn (1971), and Debreu (1959), the formal statement 
of the Walrasian economy was provided. The early work of CGE model was developed 
by Johansen (1960) who is interested in uneven growth between production sector in 
Norway. 
 In Indonesia, the first generation of CGE model was built by BPS, ISS and 
CWFS (1986), Behrman, Lewis, and Lotfi (1989), Ezaki (1989), and Thorbecke (1991). 
Their works were initiated by the close collaboration with the Indonesian National 
Planning and Development Agency (Bappenas), the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Statistics Indonesia (BPS or Badan Pusat Statistik). All of these works were mainly to 
analyses the government program in response to the decline in the oil price in the early 
1980s. In their paper, Behrman, Lewis, and Lotfi (1989), and Ezaki (1989) were utilized 
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Indonesian Input-Output tables as the primary dataset. Thus, the social behaviors are not 
completely modeled. A complete model using Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) were 
developed by BPS, ISS, and CWFS (1986), and Thorbecke (1991). 
 In the 2000s, the development of CGE models was separated into two 
categories. First, CGE models that are built using GEMPACK software such as 
INDORANI CGE model by Abimanyu (2000) joins with the Centre of Policy Studies 
(CPS), WAYANG model by Warr (2005), and the Indonesia-E3 by Yusuf and 
Resosudarmo (2008). Wayang has more disaggregated households over INDORANI, 
since it uses Indonesia SAM. The Indonesia-E3 has more households’ classification 
compared to INDORANI and WAYANG with 100 urban and rural households.  
Second, CGE models that used GAMS software. In this category, Azis (2000) 
developed a new dynamic financial CGE model for Indonesia and tried to analyze the 
impact of Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 on the social variables. In his paper, he 
found that rural households suffered less than urban households through the role of real 
wage. Mansury (2002) in his dissertation, also utilized financial CGE to establish the 
link between macroeconomic variables and income distribution and try to analyze the 
impact of the Asian financial crisis on different household groups. The financial 
framework of his model follows Bourguignon et al., while the structural model of the 
real sector is based on Azis (1997), which allows free flows of foreign capital. He 
showed that the hardest-hits of the financial crisis are urban-high, followed by rural-low 
and small-farmers. In her dissertation, Min (2014) developed dynamic Financial 
Computable General Equilibrium (FCGE) Model which explicitly incorporates bank-led 
capital inflow and dynamic behavior of the banking sector. She found two main 
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findings. First, ignoring the role of exchange rate changes in banks’ behavior (i.e., the 
dynamic component of credit channel) can yield an inaccurate picture of the impact of 
increased bank-led flows. Secondly, boom and bust cycle can be detrimental to the 
economy. 
 All those CGE models above are still limited to the national level analysis. The 
development of Inter-Regional CGE (IRCGE) for Indonesia was started by Wuryanto 
(Resosudarmo et al., 1999). In this model, the production side is divided into Java and 
Non-Java, while the household categories include Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, 
and the rest of Indonesia. It was developed using GAMS, based on Inter-Regional 
Social Accounting Matrix (IRSAM) dataset and bottom-up approach. In the 
GEMPACK environment, Pambudi and Parewangi (2004) in collaboration with the 
CPS at Monash University have developed a provincial level of CGE by utilizing 
Indonesia Input-Output table. The most recent IRCGE model was built by 
Resosudarmo, et.al. (2009c) called IRSA-INDONESIA5. This is a dynamic Inter-
Regional CGE model for five regions in Indonesia, namely Sumatra, Java and Bali, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Eastern Indonesia. However, it does not have a channel from 
interest rate policy to the real sector. Thus, it cannot be used for monetary policy 
analysis.   
 
2.4 Data 
FIRSAM 2005 is a combination between IRSAM 2005 and FSAM 2005. It 
consists of five regions namely Sumatera, Java and Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and 
Eastern Indonesia and each region comprises of 20 sectors, 18 factors of production, 4 
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institutions, regional tax, regional subsidy, and local inventory. In addition, there is also 
another account that contains 5 capital accounts, 20 imports of commodities, 17 
financial instruments, and rest of the world. (see Appendix for details). Thus, the size of 
FIRSAM 2005 is a 339x339 matrix. 
According to Resosudarmo et al. (2009b), the IRSAM 2005 for Indonesia is 
mainly based on the Inter-Regional Input-Output (IRIO) data provided in 2005. In order 
to fill the data for other accounts in the matrix, it also included (i) National Socio-
Economic Survey (SUSENAS), (ii) National and Regional Balance of Payments, (iii) 
Current Account, (iv) Population Census, (v) National Labor Force Survey 
(SAKERNAS), (vi) Special Survey on Household Investment and Savings (SKTIR), 
(vii) Propinsi dalam angka, (viii) Indonesia Statistics, and (ix) Statistik Kesejahteraan 
Rakyat. Most of these data are taken from Statistics Indonesia / Badan Pusat Statistik 
(BPS).  
In Indonesia, IRIO considered as complicated and costly since Indonesia is a big 
country with many islands and heterogeneous population, so in order to renew IRIO 
takes at least 10 (ten) years using survey method by Statistics Indonesia. Other 
supporting data such as Population Census is also available every ten years, SKTIR is 
available every two years, SUSENAS and SAKERNAS are available every year, and 
others are mostly available every year. Even though it has been more than a decade 
now, currently the latest available data is only IRSAM 2005. Therefore, in this study, 
IRSAM 2005 is deemed to be sufficiently valid. 
Moreover, FSAM 2005 is national-level dataset based on integration between 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), which represents real sector transaction, and Flow of 
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Fund (FoF), which represents financial sector transaction. In order to connect two data 
systems in such a way that SAM and FoF are consistent and integrated, the capital 
account that consists of investment and saving is needed. The dataset to construct SAM 
comes from the 2005 Indonesian Input-Output (I-O) table with additional 
supplementary data sources related to the account information of institutions. 
Meanwhile, FoF is a data system that reflects financial transaction between institutions. 
It has a set of sources and uses of funds which show the buying and selling of financial 
instruments, such as money, time deposits, bonds, etc. 
Table 2.1  The Structure of FIRSAM 2005 
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A2,1 and A2,5 : Income distribution in Java and Bali 
A2,2 : Intra-institutional transfer from Java and Bali to Java and Bali 
A2,4 : Local government income from tax in Java and Bali 
A2,6 : Intra-institutional transfer for Eastern Indonesia to Java and Bali 
A2,11 : Transfer from National Government to institutions in Java and Bali 
A2,14 : Inflow transfer from RoW to institutions in Java and Bali 
A3,2 : Final Demand of goods from Java and Bali to institutions in Java and Bali 
A3,3 : Intermediate input from sectors in Java and Bali to sectors in Java and Bali 
A3,6 : Final Demand of goods from Java and Bali to institutions in Eastern Indonesia 
A3,7 : Intermediate input from sectors in Java and Bali to sectors in Eastern Indonesia 
A3,9 : Sectoral Investment in Java and Bali 
A3,11 : Final Demand of goods from Java and Bali to national government 
A3,14 : Export from Java and Bali 
A4,3 : Local indirect tax in Java and Bali 
A5,7 : Factor demand in Eastern Indonesia 
A5,14 : Income inflow from RoW to Eastern Indonesia 
A6,1 and A6,5 : Income distribution in Eastern Indonesia 
A6,2 : Intra-institutional transfer from Java and Bali to Eastern Indonesia 
A6,6 : Intra-institutional transfer from Eastern Indonesia to Eastern Indonesia 
A6,8 : Local government income from tax in Eastern Indonesia 
A6,11 : Transfer from National Government to institutions in Eastern Indonesia 
A6,14 : Inflow transfer from RoW to institutions in Eastern Indonesia 
A7,2 : Final Demand of goods from Eastern Indonesia to Institutions in Java and Bali 
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A7,3 : Intermediate input from sectors in Eastern Indonesia to sectors in Java and Bali 
A7,6 : Final Demand of goods from Eastern Indonesia to Institutions in Eastern 
Indonesia 
A7,7 : Intermediate input from sectors in Eastern Indonesia to sectors in Eastern 
Indonesia 
A7,9 : Sectoral Investment in Eastern Indonesia 
A7,11 : Final Demand of goods from Eastern Indonesia to national government 
A7,14 : Export from Eastern Indonesia 
A8,7 : Local indirect tax in Eastern Indonesia 
A9,2 : Saving from institutions in Java and Bali 
A9,6 : Saving from institutions in Eastern Indonesia 
A9,10 : Financial liabilities 
A9,11 : National government saving 
A9,14 : Foreign saving 
A10,9 : Financial assets 
A10,14 : RoW financial liabilities 
A11,1 : Factor income from Java and Bali to national government 
A11,2 : Transfer from institutions in Java and Bali to national government 
A11,5 : Factor income from Eastern Indonesia to national government 
A11,6 : Transfer from institutions in Eastern Indonesia to national government 
A11,11 : Intra-national government transfer 
A11,12 : Government income from tax 
A11,13 : Import Tariff 
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A11,14 : Transfer from RoW to national government 
A12,3 : National indirect tax in Java and Bali 
A12,7 : National indirect tax in Eastern Indonesia 
A13,2 : Import of Final Goods in Java and Bali 
A13,3 : Imported intermediate input of sectors in Java and Bali 
A13,6 : Import of Final Goods in Eastern Indonesia 
A13,7 : Imported intermediate input of sectors in Eastern Indonesia 
A13,9 : Investment Demand of imported goods 
A13,11 : Imported national government consumption 
A14,1 : Income outflow from Java and Bali to RoW 
A14,2 : Outflow transfer from institutions in Java and Bali to RoW 
A14,5 : Income outflow from Eastern Indonesia to RoW 
A14,6 : Outflow transfer from institutions in Eastern Indonesia to RoW 
A14,10 : RoW financial assets 
A14,13 : Total Import 
   
Since there is no FoF dataset at the regional level, the national FoF dataset is 
used to add financial sector transaction into the IRSAM 2005. The integration of FoF 
into the IRSAM 2005 needs some adjustment process because both IRSAM 2005 and 
SAM 2005 are developed by different institutions, and they are both have different 
elements even though they are using the same 2005 figures. In the adjustment process, 
the IRSAM 2005 is modified such that the aggregated IRSAM 2005 are matched with 
the SAM 2005. This process is complicated since the balanced between total rows and 
 49 
 
columns must be maintained. The final structure of FIRSAM 2005 dataset is illustrated 
in Table 2.1 above. 
 
2.5 Methodology 
The simplest way to do the analysis using FIRSAM 2005 is by creating 
FIRSAM 2005 multiplier. This method is simple, but there are many limitations such 
that in this model the prices are constant, demand driven, excess capacity and etc. Due 
to this limitation, Financial Inter-Regional Computable General Equilibrium Model 
(FIRCGE Model) will be constructed based on FIRSAM 2005. The FIRCGE model will 
give us a comprehensive analytical tool in which the equilibrium outcomes of 
endogenous variables are determined simultaneously from a system of many 
interrelated markets in the economy.  It incorporates the behavior of each agent and its 
relation to the other agents such that all agents behave optimally in the economy. 
The financial sector in FIRCGE allows us to analyze the impact of monetary 
policy through balance sheet channel in addition to interest rates channel as in the 
model without financial sector, IRCGE. The interest rates channel works through 
investment expenditures as the interest rate changes. Higher interest rates induce higher 
cost of capital so lower investment expenditures. However, the balance sheet channel 
reflects the impact of monetary policy on institutions’ balance sheet. Monetary policy 
causes a change in financial wealth, which indicated an increase or a decrease in the 
value of assets or liabilities in balance sheets. 
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2.5.1 Basic Structure of the Model 
The structure of FIRCGE model from the viewpoint of the flow of goods and 
factors can be illustrated as in Figure 2.1 below. The flows are explained from bottom 
to top as follows: 
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Figure 2.1  Structure of IRCGE Model from the viewpoint of goods and factors 
 
For every region, in the first stage of the production function, Factor Demand of 
Labor and Non-labor are aggregated using Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
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into Value-Added (VA). In the second stage of the production function for each region, 
Value-Added and Intermediate Inputs are combined using CES to produce total output 
(X). Then, some of the total output (X) are sold domestically, to other regions, and the 
rest are sold in the foreign country as an export. In this case, the Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation (CET) is used to disaggregate the total output into domestic goods (D), 
domestic exported goods (ED) and foreign exported goods (E). Next, domestic goods 
(D) is combined with domestic imported goods (MD), and foreign imported goods (M) 
using CES production function to produce composite goods (Q). Then, the composite 
goods Q is distributed into Consumption Demand (CD), Investment Demand (ID), 
Government Consumption Demand (GD), Intermediate Uses (INTM) and stock 
(STOCK). Real GDP (GDPR) then calculated by summing up consumption demand, 
investment demand, government consumption demand, and net export, which is total 
export minus import, in every region. Lastly, to make sure the market for intra-national 
trade is clear, the total domestic export must equal to the total domestic import. 
Figure 2.2 below shows the structure of FIRCGE model for income, 
expenditure, transfer and financial blocks. As can be seen, the total income comprises of 
the income from government, non-government and foreign institution. The government 
receives income from indirect tax, import tariff, factor income and transfers. The non-
government institutions namely households and companies get income from factor 
income and transfers. Moreover, foreign institutions’ income is from selling goods as an 
import, factor income and transfers.  
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Figure 2.2  Structure of IRCGE Model for Income, Expenditure, and Transfer Block 
 
Some of the total income then is used for expenditure, and the rest is saved as 
saving. In the expenditure side, households spend part of their income for consumption, 
direct tax, and transfers. The companies spend part of their money only for transfers. 
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The government spends part of its income for subsidy and transfers. Lastly, foreign 
institutions spend their money for transfers and to buy goods as export. Moreover, the 
transfers not only happen between institutions in the same region but also occur 
between institution in different regions. The interlink between regions is captured 
through this kind of transfers. 
In the financial block, saving must be equal to flow of wealth. The flow of 
wealth becomes stock of wealth by adding the lag of saving stock. The stock of wealth 
and the stock of liabilities are located on the liability side in the balance sheet. The total 
stock of wealth and stock of liabilities must be equal to the total assets which consist of 
stock of assets and stock of fix assets. This stock of fix assets is the lag of fix assets 
stock plus the flow of fix assets from the addition of capital stock and investment. In the 
model without a financial block, total saving is just equal to the sum of investment in 
the real sector.    
In this model, the investment is determined endogenously mainly by interest rate 
and the elasticity parameters are estimated using econometric model. With this 
investment equation, interest rate as a monetary policy can enter the model through the 
cost of capital in the standard interest rate channel. In addition to the cost of capital, as 
can be seen in Figure 2.2 above, the interest rate will also affect the model though the 
institutional transfers as a return from holding assets. The change in interest rate also 
have implications on the financial wealth of each institution.   
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2.6 Model 
The model is built based on the assumption of perfect competition with 
Constant-Return-to-Scale (CRS) for simplicity. This section will explain only the 
important equations in the model. The other equation will be listed in the Appendix. 
2.6.1 Output Production  
In the first stage of production, the firms choose input factor 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟with 
price of 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  to produce composite factor (or Value Added, 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟). Their minimizing the 
cost of production subject to CES technology. min 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟�𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑓𝑓
 
subject to  
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 ��𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟�𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
𝑓𝑓
�
1
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
 
where  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 is scaling coefficient in the Value Added production function 
 𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 is input share coefficient �0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1� 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 is parameter defined by elasticity of substitution �𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1� 
 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹is the elasticity of substitution in Value Added production function 
The first order condition for the problem above imply the demand function 
 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎝
⎜
⎛ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉 �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹
⎠
⎟
⎞
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.1) 
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Substituting demand function into production function and then simplifying it yields 
unit cost function 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉 = 1𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 � �𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉�𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓 �
1
1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
 (2.2) 
In the second stage of production, value added is combined with the 
intermediate inputs using CES production function to produce total output, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟. The 
firms choose Value Added, 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟, and Intermediate Inputs, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟, with 
corresponding price  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉  and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 , respectively. The minimization problem is min
𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
subject to 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋� 1𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 
where  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋  is scaling coefficient in the 2nd stage of output production  
 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼  are input share coefficient �0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹,≤ 1, 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼 ,≤ 1� 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋 is parameter defined by elasticity of substitution �𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 ≤ 1� 
 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋is the elasticity of substitution in 2nd stage of output production  
The demand function then can be derived as follows: 
 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.3) 
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 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.4) 
and the unit cost function becomes 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 = 1𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 ��𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉 �1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 �1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋� 11−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 (2.5) 
  
2.6.2 Transformation between Domestic Goods and Export Goods 
Total output will be sold domestically as Domestic Goods, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟, with price  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 , 
will be sold abroad as an Export Goods, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟, with price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹, and will be sold to other 
regions as a domestic Export, 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟, with price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁, which is the price of intra-national 
trade. The firms are assumed to transform total output into good sold in domestic 
market and in international market using Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) 
as a transformation process. In this case, the firms maximize profit subject to 
technological constraint. max
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 = �(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟� − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟  
subject to 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� 1𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 
where  𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 is indirect domestic tax rates 
 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is production subsidy share 
𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇  is scaling coefficient in transformation  
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 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 , 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 are input share coefficient �0 ≤ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1,0 ≤ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1 � 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇 is parameter defined by elasticity of transformation �𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇+1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 , 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 ≥ 1� 
 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇is the elasticity of transformation between domestic goods and export goods 
   
By solving the maximization problem, the supply function of domestic goods and 
export goods are 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇+1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.6) 
 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇+1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.7) 
 𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇+1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.8) 
After some algebra, the unit cost function is 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 = 1𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 ��𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  �(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �1+𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇
+ �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹)1+𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 + �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁)1+𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� 11+𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  (2.9) 
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2.6.3 Substitution between Domestic Goods and Import Goods 
 Domestic and import goods are not directly consumed by households, firms, and 
government. However, they are combined into goods called Armington Composite 
Goods. The firms are assumed to maximize their profit by choosing a suitable 
combination of domestic goods, imported goods from abroad, 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 and imported goods 
from other regions, 𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 subject to technological constraint that are assumed to follow 
CES function. max
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 ,𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄  𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 − �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + (1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟�  
  subject to 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹  𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹 𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉� 1𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  
where  𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  is scaling coefficient in Armington production  
 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 , 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹 are input share coefficient �0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1,0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1 � 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹 is parameter defined by elasticity of substitution �𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 , 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 ≤ 1� 
 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹is the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and import goods 
The optimal demand function for domestic goods, import goods from abroad, and 
imported goods from other regions are 
 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.10) 
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 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄(1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.11) 
 𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.12) 
The unit cost function is 
 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 = 1𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 ��𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  ((1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺)1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉
+ �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁)1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉� 11−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 (2.13) 
2.6.4 Income Block 
As shown in Figure 2.2, income block consists of government income, non-
government income and foreign income. They are formulated as follows: 
Government Income 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = ��𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟2,𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟2
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟2+ � �𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
+ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙����𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟2�
𝑟𝑟2
+ 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�
𝑖𝑖
− 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙��𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟
 
(2.14) 
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Non-Government Income 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 = ��𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟2,𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟2
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟2+ � �𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
 
(2.15) 
Foreign Income 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 = ��𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑟𝑟2,𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟2
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟2+ 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟+ ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
 
(2.16) 
where  𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟2,𝑓𝑓,𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 are share coefficients, 
𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟2 is factor income, 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 is indirect tax, 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is import tariff, 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 is 
government subsidy, and 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2 is transfer between institution. In the 
income side, the sign of government subsidy is negative because government subsidy is 
considered as spending. 
2.6.5 Expenditure Block 
 In this block, there are four types of expenditure namely, households 
expenditure, government expenditure, non-households non-government / company 
expenditure, and foreign expenditure. Households consume some of their disposable 
income indicated by one minus marginal propensity to save (MPS). The expenditure 
equations are described as follows: 
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Households expenditure 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 + ��𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙.𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙+ ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟2.𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟2
+ ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟.𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟
 
(2.17) 
Government expenditure 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟+ � �𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
 
(2.18) 
Non-household and non-government expenditure 
 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 = ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙.𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
 (2.19) 
Foreign expenditure 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 = 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟��𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟
+ ��𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟.𝑓𝑓,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟+ ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙.𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
 
(2.20) 
where  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 and  𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 are share coefficient, 𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 is consumption 
by households, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 is government goods demand, and 𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙.𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 is direct 
tax. 𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟.𝑓𝑓,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 is domestic's earning abroad.  
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2.6.6 Market Clearing 
After describing the behavior of each agent above, it is necessary to make sure 
that supply meets demand in all market. In the market for intra-national trade, the total 
domestic export must be equal to the total domestic import, or 
 �𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟
= �𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟
 (2.21) 
This relationship decides the price of the intra-national trade, which is the same across 
regions. In the final goods market, the supply of Armington goods, 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟, equals to 
summation of final goods demand by institutions, intermediate supply for production, 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟, and also stock 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟. 
 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 (2.22) 
2.6.7 Investment Equation 
 In the common CGE model, investment is treated as an exogenous variable 
which is defined by a value from outside the model. In order to make investment 
endogenous, we need to specify the investment equation. In this research, the 
investment equation is defined as a function of value added and interest rate. The 
elasticity parameters of value added and interest rate to the investment for this function 
is taken from the estimation of the investment using econometric model.2 
2.6.8 Financial Block 
In general, financial block described the relationship between assets, liabilities, 
and interest rate. Assets and liabilities can be a stock variable in current and previous 
                                                 
2 The elasticity parameter of value added is taken from Min (2014), while the elasticity of interest rate is 
obtained from previous chapter of this dissertation with adjustment. 
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period namely 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠, 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠, or can be a 
flow variable such as 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠. The lag of stock variables is not available in 
FIRSAM 2005 dataset, so additional data from other sources is needed. This stock 
dataset is useful to calculate the return on assets as additional income from investing in 
financial sector. This income then goes to the income block through transfer from 
institution who sell the assets to the institution who own or buy the assets. 
 For assets or liabilities other than currency and demand deposit, the decision of 
assets of liabilities allocation depends on the change of corresponding interest rate from 
the beginning period and the elasticity parameter which shows how much the assets or 
liabilities will change as the interest rate moving. In general, the assets or liabilities 
allocation can be formulated as follows 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝜃𝜃1𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 � 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛0𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝜎𝜎1𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟  
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = 𝜃𝜃2𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 � 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛0𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝜎𝜎2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (2.23) 
where  𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 and  𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛0𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 are interest rate in current and beginning period, respectively.  
𝜃𝜃1𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 and 𝜃𝜃2𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 are elasticity parameters. 
 As for currency and demand deposit, both assets depend not only on the change 
in interest rate and elasticity parameter but also from the income of institution and the 
scale parameter. This relationship is described by money demand equation as follows 
 𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ��𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
�
𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟1𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)−𝛼𝛼3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2.24) 
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where  𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟1𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 is average interest rate of currency and demand deposits, 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 is the 
scale parameter, and 𝛼𝛼3𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 and 𝛼𝛼3𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛are elasticity parameters. All of those elasticity 
parameters in financial block are taken from previous study by Min (2014).  
 The final step in this financial block is maintaining the balance of the financial 
account for each institution.  
 �𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
+ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 (2.25) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 is the stock value of fix assets, and 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛is the stock value of wealth 
or similar to equity. The stock of fix assets reflects the investment accumulation in real 
sector, while the stock of wealth is equal to the stock of saving in real sector. From the 
view point of balance sheet for individual institution, assets in the left side, should be 
equal to liabilities plus equity in the right side. In this equation, assets from investing in 
financial assets,  ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 , and from investing in real sector, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛, in the left 
hand side should be equal to liabilities, ∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 , plus equity, 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛. 
2.6.9 Closures  
Closures are the assumptions of the variables that are exogenous to the model. 
These assumptions are necessary to make sure the number of equations is the same as 
the number of endogenous variables, so the model can be solved. The variables that are 
set to be exogenous in the model are: 
a. World import and export prices 
b. Exchange rate 
c. Price of factors for non-labor 
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d. Factor income of foreign institutions 
e. Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS) 
f. Government expenditure 
g. Government and other transfers 
h. Government and foreign institutions’ investment 
i. Capital stock and inventory 
j. Labor Supply 
k. All the lag of stock in financial block 
l. All interest rate except interest rate associated with government bond and 
foreign exchange reserves 
m. Stock of foreign exchange reserves held by institution both in asset and liability 
side 
n. Stock of government bond and other financial instruments held by institution as 
an asset 
 
2.7 Analysis and Simulation 
This section will focus on conducting an experiment using FIRCGE model on 
the current economic shock that is happening in Indonesia and then figuring out the 
right policies that can support monetary and fiscal authorities to achieve their 
objectives. In this experiment, the tradeoff between monetary policy and fiscal policy 
will be discussed in details.  
The current economic shock in this experiment is a sharp decline in world crude 
oil price that happened lately as shown in Figure 2.3 below. The major reason for this 
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significant drop in oil price is the refusal to curb over-production of oil from Saudi 
Arabia. Some economists said Saudis are trying to price their competitors out of the oil 
market. As the world’s largest oil exporting country, Saudi Arabia can fulfill oil 
demand at the prevailing market price, while other countries mostly cannot. The other 
oil exporting countries, such as Russia who is the primary supplier of oil for European 
countries cannot afford to cut oil production to drive prices up because Russian 
Federation does not want to lose partners to a competitor especially Saudi Arabia. 
 
Figure 2.3  Crude Oil Price (Brent) 2011-2016 
 
Such behaviors have led to a global low oil price equilibrium that may have a 
negative impact on the country such as Indonesia even though Indonesia is now a net 
importer of oil. This is because the exports value of oil is not small and the high 
backward and forward linkage of oil sector with other sectors. On the one hand, the 
backward linkage is defined as the growth of a sector, in this case, oil sector, that leads 
to the growth of the sector that supplies input to the oil sector. On the other hand, the 
forward linkage can be described as the growth of oil sector that leads to growth the 
other sector that uses oil sector output as input. The results of the 10% decline of world 
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oil price to macro variables both at national level and regional level are shown in Table 
2.2 and Table 2.3 below. 
The impact of 10% world oil price decline is reflected in “Scenario 1” column. 
As can be seen, GDP decreases by 0.716% from the baseline because of the high 
backward and forward linkage of oil sector with other sectors as discussed earlier. 
However, as oil price declines, the inflation falls as well. The oil price reduction leads 
to lower cost of production and transportation. As a result, the price of final goods is 
decreasing. Consumption, investment, and export decline as GDP contracted, but import 
increases as oil import price drops. The unemployment rate is higher than baseline 
because of lower GDP. In contrast, the gap between rural and urban incomes narrows in 
comparison to the baseline which means the income of households that live in an urban 
area has been affected negatively by this kind of shock. Income distribution between 
rural and urban is defined by dividing the income of rural households by the income 
urban households. Thus, a higher number indicates a narrowing gap between rural and 
urban incomes and hence a more equal urban-rural distribution of income at the national 
level. 
Table 2.2  Summary Results of the 10% World Oil Price Decline at National Level 
 
Variable Scenario 1 
GDP -0.716% 
Inflation -0.098% 
Consumption -0.449% 
Investment -0.477% 
Export -0.772% 
Import 0.447% 
UnemplRate 3.327% 
IncDistRuralUrban 0.020% 
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At the regional level, the most negatively affected region from oil price decline 
in term of GDP is Sumatra, followed by Jawa and Bali because both regions are the two 
largest oil and gas exporter region in Indonesia, which is why the exports from those 
regions significantly drop. Consequently, the output is also decreasing significantly in 
those regions. Lower output leads to lower investment and lower consumption. As for 
inflation, all regions are experiencing deflation. In terms of income inequality, all 
regions except only Jawa and Bali, and Eastern Indonesia have benefited from this oil 
price shock. 
Table 2.3  Results of the 10% World Oil Price Decline at Regional Level 
 
Variable Region Scenario 1 
GDP Sumatra -2.186% 
GDP Java and Bali -0.444% 
GDP Kalimantan 0.141% 
GDP Sulawesi -0.123% 
GDP Eastern Indonesia 0.087% 
Inflation Sumatra -0.122% 
Inflation Java and Bali -0.083% 
Inflation Kalimantan -0.172% 
Inflation Sulawesi -0.131% 
Inflation Eastern Indonesia -0.125% 
Consumption Sumatra -1.495% 
Consumption Java and Bali -0.241% 
Consumption Kalimantan 0.244% 
Consumption Sulawesi -0.166% 
Consumption Eastern Indonesia -0.083% 
Investment Sumatra -0.485% 
Investment Java and Bali -0.477% 
Investment Kalimantan -0.382% 
Investment Sulawesi -0.511% 
Investment Eastern Indonesia -0.558% 
Export Sumatra -4.047% 
Export Java and Bali -0.048% 
Export Kalimantan 0.449% 
Export Sulawesi -0.052% 
Export Eastern Indonesia 0.335% 
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Variable Region Scenario 1 
Import Sumatra -0.239% 
Import Java and Bali 0.578% 
Import Kalimantan 0.914% 
Import Sulawesi -0.683% 
Import Eastern Indonesia -0.482% 
IncDistRuralUrban Sumatra 0.118% 
IncDistRuralUrban Java and Bali -0.007% 
IncDistRuralUrban Kalimantan 0.079% 
IncDistRuralUrban Sulawesi 0.025% 
IncDistRuralUrban Eastern Indonesia -0.067% 
Output Sumatra -1.830% 
Output Java and Bali -0.254% 
Output Kalimantan 0.204% 
Output Sulawesi -0.335% 
Output Eastern Indonesia -0.191% 
 
Policymakers’ objectives must be defined in order to find the right policies to 
reduce the negative impact of the world oil price reduction shock. The central bank as 
monetary authority has an objective to maintain price stability. In this paper, the central 
bank uses interest rate as a primary policy instrument to drive up and down the 
economy. On the other hand, the government as a fiscal authority has an objective to 
manage the GDP level back to normal as negative shock hit the economy. For policy 
simulation, the fiscal policy will be focused on using government spending. Therefore, 
the objectives of both central bank and government can be defined as achieving stability 
of price and achieving high economic growth. Since the model has the ability to 
simulate the impact of the policy at the regional level, the objective must also be 
obtained at the regional level. This objectives are formulated into loss function type A 
as follows: 
 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 𝐴𝐴 = 100��0.5 �𝑝𝑝1𝑟𝑟 − 𝑝𝑝0𝑟𝑟
𝑝𝑝0𝑟𝑟 �2 + 𝒊𝒊 0.5 �𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1𝑟𝑟 − 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃0𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃0𝑟𝑟 �2�𝑟𝑟  (2.26) 
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where 𝑝𝑝1𝑟𝑟 and 𝑝𝑝0𝑟𝑟 are the price level after policy and the price level at the baseline, 
respectively. 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1𝑟𝑟 is the GDP level after policy was imposed and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃0𝑟𝑟 is the GDP 
level at the baseline. 𝒊𝒊 is a variable which indicates 1 if the 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1𝑟𝑟 <= 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃0𝑟𝑟 and -1 if 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1𝑟𝑟 > 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃0𝑟𝑟. This variable is needed to make sure the loss function will increase 
when GDP level after the shock is less than or equal to the baseline level and vice versa.  
This Loss function will maintain the price and GDP level in every region close 
to the baseline level before oil price shock was imposed. For neutrality between 
monetary and fiscal authority objective, both regional price and GDP are weighted 
equally. The right policies can be obtained by simulating possible policies that can 
make the loss function minimum. 
Besides these combined objectives, the simulation also includes individual 
government’s objective to achieve high economic growth. If there is a negative shock, 
the government wants to minimize the gap between the national GDP after policy and 
the baseline national GDP. The stability of price is not relevant with the oil price 
decline shock because this shock has a positive impact on inflation. Thus, there is no 
simulation using central bank’s objective. The stability of GDP can be represented as 
loss function type B: 
 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆 = � 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃0
𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃0 � (2.27) 
On the one hand, there are two types of government fiscal stimulus. First, the 
government distributes fiscal stimulus to each region in proportion to the baseline GDP 
level. This is called untargeted fiscal stimulus. Second, the government distributes fiscal 
stimulus to each region in proportion to the shortfall of regional GDP level caused by 
oil price shock, in short, it is called targeted fiscal stimulus. On the other hand, the 
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central bank has only one national policy; it does not have a regional policy. Therefore, 
in every loss function, there will be two scenarios. The first scenario is a combination of 
untargeted fiscal stimulus with monetary policy. The second scenario is combination 
between targeted fiscal policy and monetary policy. 
In order to see the tradeoff between fiscal stimulus and monetary policy, the iso-
loss curves are drawn. The iso-loss curves are the possible combination of fiscal 
stimulus and monetary policy such that the certain value of loss function is achieved. 
For example, in the loss function type A, 90% of Total Loss represents the possible 
combination of fiscal stimulus and monetary policy if policymakers want to reduce the 
total loss function by only 10%. In loss function type B, 80% of GDP Decline 
represents the possible combination of policies such that the GDP shortfall is reduced 
by 20%. The iso-loss curve is drawn by simulating the combination between interest 
rate, which ranges from 0 to 100 basis points (bps) with 1 bps increment, and fiscal 
stimulus, which ranges from 0 to 3 trillion rupiahs with increment of 0.01 trillion 
rupiah, and then finding the combination of policies that achieved certain value of loss 
function. 
2.7.1 The Combination of Untargeted Fiscal Stimulus and Interest Rate  
Figure 2.4 below shows the iso-loss curve of combination between untargeted 
fiscal stimulus and interest rate using loss function type A. As shown below, the iso-
curve of the 90% and 85% of total loss can be approximated by a linear function. The 
higher the policymakers want to reduce the total loss, the higher the fiscal stimulus is 
needed. This is shown by the outward shift of iso-loss curve from the origin as the 
reduction of total loss is getting higher. The slope of the iso-loss curve indicates the 
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tradeoff between interest rate and fiscal stimulus. For example, the slope of -0.0204 
means that the government could reduce the total fiscal stimulus by 0.0204 trillion 
rupiahs as the central bank increase its interest rate by 1 bps. From the graph, the iso-
loss curve is getting steeper as the reduction of total loss is getting higher.   
 
Figure 2.4  Iso Loss Curves for Untargeted Fiscal Stimulus using Loss Function type A 
 
The iso-loss curves using loss function type B are illustrated in Figure 2.5 
below. As can be seen in the graph, the slopes between each iso-curve are almost the 
same, about -0.027. This number may become a guidance for policymakers, especially 
on how the central bank should coordinate with the government if the objective function 
is just reducing the GDP shortfall because of oil price shock.    
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Figure 2.5  Iso Loss Curves for Untargeted Fiscal Stimulus using Loss Function type B 
 
2.7.2 The Combination of Targeted Fiscal Stimulus and Interest Rate  
In this scenario, the fiscal stimulus is injected in the proportion of the GDP 
shortfall because of the oil price decline shock. Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 show the iso-
curves of combination between targeted fiscal stimulus and interest rate using loss 
function type A, and the iso-curves using loss function type B, respectively. As seen in 
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7, all the iso-curve can be approximated using the linear 
function.  
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Figure 2.6  Iso Loss Curves for Targeted Fiscal Stimulus using Loss Function type A 
 
 
Figure 2.7  Iso Loss Curves for Targeted Fiscal Stimulus using Loss Function type B 
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2.7.3 Comparison between Untargeted and Targeted Fiscal Stimulus  
 
Figure 2.8  Comparison between Untargeted and Targeted Fiscal Stimulus 
 
Figure 2.8 above shows comparison between untargeted and targeted fiscal 
stimulus at the same value of loss function, which is 90% of the total loss. This 
comparison is focused on the loss function type A since it considers both central bank’s 
and government’s objectives. At the 90% of the total loss function, we can see that 
targeted fiscal stimulus is more efficient than untargeted one because targeted fiscal 
stimulus requires less money than untargeted fiscal stimulus. This is shown by the 
inward tilt of targeted fiscal stimulus iso-curve to the origin.   
The right policy can be chosen from those iso-loss curves based on the 
government budget and the central bank’s constraints on how far the interest rate can be 
reduced. In other words, the iso-loss curves give the options for central bank and 
government on how they should coordinate in order to achieve the desired target. 
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The model will be run with the particular combination of policies to see the 
detailed results of the simulation. In this simulation assume that both central bank and 
government want to reduce the loss function type A by 10%. The government is using 
targeted fiscal stimulus and has a limited budget for fiscal stimulus, say 0.21 trillion 
rupiahs. In this situation, the central bank needs to reduce the interest rate by 25bps.    
Table 2.4  Simulation Results at National Level 
 
Variable Unit 
Without 
Policies 
90% of Total 
Loss 
GDP  %  -0.716% -0.654% 
Inflation  %  -0.098% -0.081% 
Consumption  %  -0.449% -0.392% 
Investment  %  -0.477% -0.314% 
Export  %  -0.772% -0.757% 
Import  %  0.447% 0.547% 
UnemplRate % 3.327% 2.799% 
IncDistRuralUrban  %  0.020% 0.029% 
Loss    0.025505   0.022792  
FiscalSpending  million Rp    210,000  
 
Table 2.5  Simulation Results at Regional Level 
 
Variable Region Unit 
Without 
Policies 
90% of Total 
Loss 
GDP Sumatra % -2.186% -2.083% 
GDP Java and Bali % -0.444% -0.383% 
GDP Kalimantan % 0.141% 0.114% 
GDP Sulawesi % -0.123% -0.016% 
GDP 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
0.087% 0.055% 
Inflation Sumatra % -0.122% -0.104% 
Inflation Java and Bali % -0.083% -0.067% 
Inflation Kalimantan % -0.172% -0.141% 
Inflation Sulawesi % -0.131% -0.109% 
Inflation 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
-0.125% -0.103% 
Consumption Sumatra % -1.495% -1.409% 
Consumption Java and Bali % -0.241% -0.189% 
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Variable Region Unit 
Without 
Policies 
90% of Total 
Loss 
Consumption Kalimantan % 0.244% 0.232% 
Consumption Sulawesi % -0.166% -0.055% 
Consumption 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
-0.083% -0.060% 
Investment Sumatra % -0.485% -0.321% 
Investment Java and Bali % -0.477% -0.314% 
Investment Kalimantan % -0.382% -0.233% 
Investment Sulawesi % -0.511% -0.337% 
Investment 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
-0.558% -0.375% 
Export Sumatra % -4.047% -4.012% 
Export Java and Bali % -0.048% -0.030% 
Export Kalimantan % 0.449% 0.413% 
Export Sulawesi % -0.052% 0.070% 
Export 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
0.335% 0.262% 
Import Sumatra % -0.239% -0.087% 
Import Java and Bali % 0.578% 0.661% 
Import Kalimantan % 0.914% 1.036% 
Import Sulawesi % -0.683% -0.448% 
Import 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
-0.482% -0.246% 
IncDistRuralUrban Sumatra % 0.118% 0.132% 
IncDistRuralUrban Java and Bali % -0.007% 0.001% 
IncDistRuralUrban Kalimantan % 0.079% 0.078% 
IncDistRuralUrban Sulawesi % 0.025% 0.030% 
IncDistRuralUrban 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
-0.067% -0.043% 
Output Sumatra % -1.830% -1.740% 
Output Java and Bali % -0.254% -0.190% 
Output Kalimantan % 0.204% 0.217% 
Output Sulawesi % -0.335% -0.177% 
Output 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
-0.191% -0.140% 
DomGood Sumatra % -1.265% -1.135% 
DomGood Java and Bali % -0.266% -0.200% 
DomGood Kalimantan % -0.003% 0.033% 
DomGood Sulawesi % -0.385% -0.221% 
DomGood 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
-0.440% -0.333% 
CompGood Sumatra % -1.101% -0.971% 
CompGood Java and Bali % -0.266% -0.195% 
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Variable Region Unit 
Without 
Policies 
90% of Total 
Loss 
CompGood Kalimantan % -0.107% -0.039% 
CompGood Sulawesi % -0.479% -0.289% 
CompGood 
Eastern 
Indonesia % 
-0.522% -0.371% 
RegLoss Sumatra   0.023962 0.021745 
RegLoss Java and Bali   0.001020 0.000755 
RegLoss Kalimantan   0.000246 0.000164 
RegLoss Sulawesi   0.000161 0.000060 
RegLoss 
Eastern 
Indonesia   
0.000116 0.000068 
FiscalStimulus Sumatra 
million 
Rp 
 181780.4 
FiscalStimulus Java and Bali 
million 
Rp 
 36930.99 
FiscalStimulus Kalimantan 
million 
Rp 
 -11707.9 
FiscalStimulus Sulawesi 
million 
Rp 
 10200.53 
FiscalStimulus 
Eastern 
Indonesia 
million 
Rp 
 -7204.04 
 
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the simulation results of 10 % oil decline without 
and with policies at national level and regional level, respectively. As can be seen, if the 
central bank coordinates with the government to reduce the loss function by 90%. The 
national GDP level only decreases by 0.654% compared to the GDP decline before 
policies, 0.716%. However, the inflation is slightly higher, at -0.081% compared to the 
price without policies, at -0.098%. This is because of the expansionary fiscal policy and 
loose monetary policy. The national GDP components like consumption, investment, 
export, and import are better relative to those without policies. The unemployment rate 
has an improvement compared to the one without policies, from 3.327% to 2.799%. 
Moreover, the income distribution between rural and urban are also getting better 
compared to the one without policies, from 0.020% to 0.029%. 
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At regional level, every region has improvement in term of GDP level, but some 
regions such as Sumatra, Java, and Bali, and Sulawesi still have GDP decline at -
2.083%, -0.383%, and -0.016% from the baseline, respectively. However, all regions 
are experiencing lower price compared to baseline. The regional GDP components, in 
general, have increased compared to those of without policies. Only regional income 
distribution in Kalimantan are worsening after policies were imposed even though at 
national level, the income distribution is improving. Lastly, the regional loss function in 
every region is lower after policies were imposed. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
In the country with many regions like Indonesia, having the comprehensive tool 
like FIRCGE that can do the analysis of the impact of specific shock to the regional 
economy with general equilibrium framework is a must for policy makers. The common 
practice of using partial equilibrium model might be misleading because the ceteris 
paribus assumption might not correct. The FIRCGE gives you better understanding of 
not only the impact of the shock to the macro variables but also to micro variables for 
every sector and every region of the economy. In addition, it also covers both real sector 
and financial sector. 
As shown in the results above, the reduction of world oil price has different 
impact to the region Indonesia. For example, the most affected region due to the 
reduction of world oil price is Sumatra, because it is the largest oil and gas production 
region in Indonesia. The characteristics of each region play an important role that makes 
the impact of every shock different. 
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In reality, when the shock hit the economy, and it has negative impacts on the 
economy, the central bank as a monetary authority and government as a fiscal authority 
have difficulty on how should they coordinate and how they should react. This is even 
harder when those questions should also consider the implication on a regional 
dimension. With FIRCGE, the combination of monetary and fiscal policy can be 
simulated such that the policymakers’ objectives are achieved. The iso-loss curves give 
the policy makers a better picture on how they should coordinate, and how they should 
react given their constraints. It gives them the possibilities frontiers which give them 
flexibilities to choose. Hence, they can come up with the right policies. 
Based on the simulation results, the untargeted policy is less efficient than the 
targeted policy when both price stability and GDP stability are considered. Or in other 
words, fiscal stimulus should be injected based on priority starting from the most 
affected region to the less affected region by the shock. This will help the government 
to save money or reduce the fiscal deficit through a more efficient allocation of 
government resources.  
2.8.1 Further Research 
 This model only suggests two rules on how fiscal stimulus should be distributed 
across the regions and shows that targeted fiscal policy rule is better than the untargeted 
fiscal policy rules in terms of efficiency. There must be any other kind of rules that may 
give an even better result that the targeted fiscal policy rule. The room to improve the 
rule is still wide open. 
 In term of the loss function, the policy makers might also consider any other 
options like quadratic GDP gap, or different weight of inflation stability and GDP 
 81 
 
stability on loss function type A. The decision of the objective or loss function is 
important since different objective or loss function would give us different results. 
 Lastly, the FIRCGE model in this paper is not dynamic. The movement from 
static FIRCGE to dynamic FIRCGE might provide us with more comprehensive and 
better understanding of the impact of the shocks and/or policies to the economy because 
the change of the economy in one period should have an effect on the next period and 
so on. 
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APPENDIX 
 
FIRSAM Components 
No. Abbreviation Category Description 
1 LAGRPR Factor of Production Formal Rural Agricultural Labor 
2 LAGRPU Factor of Production Formal Urban Agricultural Labor 
3 LAGRUR Factor of Production Informal Rural Agricultural Labor 
4 LAGRUU Factor of Production Informal Urban Agricultural Labor 
5 LOPRPR Factor of Production Formal Rural Manual Labor 
6 LOPRPU Factor of Production Formal Urban Manual Labor 
7 LOPRUR Factor of Production Informal Rural Manual Labor 
8 LOPRUU Factor of Production Informal Urban Manual Labor 
9 LCLEPR Factor of Production Formal Rural Clerical Labor 
10 LCLEPU Factor of Production Formal Urban Clerical Labor 
11 LCLEUR Factor of Production Informal Rural Clerical Labor 
12 LCLEUU Factor of Production Informal Urban Clerical Labor 
13 LPROPR Factor of Production Formal Rural Professional Labor 
14 LPROPU Factor of Production Formal Urban Professional Labor 
15 LPROUR Factor of Production Informal Rural Professional Labor 
16 LPROUU Factor of Production Informal Urban Professional Labor 
17 KCAP Factor of Production Capital 
18 KLAND Factor of Production Land 
19 HHR Institution Rural Households 
20 HHU Institution Urban Households 
21 GOV Institution Government 
22 COMP Institution Companies 
23 FCROPS Production Sector Food crops  
24 NFCROP Production Sector Non-food crops  
25 LVSTCK Production Sector Livestock 
26 FOREST Production Sector Forestry 
27 FISH Production Sector Fishery  
28 OILGAS Production Sector Oil, Gas and Geothermal Mining 
29 NOILGS Production Sector Coal and Other Mining 
30 OILMF Production Sector Refinery and Palm oil 
31 NOILMF Production Sector Fish Processing, Food and Drink 
Processing, Textiles, Foot and Leather, 
Wood Processing, Pulp and Paper, 
Rubber Processing, Petrochemical, 
Cement, Basic Metal, Metal 
Processing, Transport Equipment 
Electricity Machinery, Other Industries 
32 UTILI Production Sector Electricity, Gas and Drinking Water 
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No. Abbreviation Category Description 
33 CONST Production Sector Construction 
34 TRADE Production Sector Trade 
35 HOTEL Production Sector Hotel and Restaurant 
36 LNDTRN Production Sector Land Transportation 
37 WTRTRN Production Sector Water Transportation 
38 AIRTRN Production Sector Air Transportation 
39 COMMU Production Sector Communications 
40 FINAN Production Sector Finance 
41 PUBSRV Production Sector Public Services 
42 OTHSRV Production Sector Other Services 
43 INDTAX Tax Indirect Tax 
44 SUBS Subsidy Subsidy 
45 STOCK Inventory Inventory 
46 KAHHR Capital Account Rural Households Capital Account 
47 KAHHU Capital Account Urban Households Capital Account 
48 KAGOV Capital Account Government Capital Account 
49 KACOMP Capital Account Companies Capital Account 
50 KAROW Capital Account Foreign institution Capital Account 
51 MFCROPS Import Commodity Food crops  
52 MNFCROP Import Commodity Non-food crops  
53 MLVSTCK Import Commodity Livestock 
54 MFOREST Import Commodity Forestry 
55 MFISH Import Commodity Fishery  
56 MOILGAS Import Commodity Oil, Gas and Geothermal Mining 
57 MNOILGS Import Commodity Coal and Other Mining 
58 MOILMF Import Commodity Refinery and Palm oil 
59 MNOILMF Import Commodity Fish Processing, Food and Drink 
Processing, Textiles, Foot and Leather, 
Wood Processing, Pulp and Paper, 
Rubber Processing, Petrochemical, 
Cement, Basic Metal, Metal 
Processing, Transport Equipment 
Electricity Machinery, Other Industries 
60 MUTILI Import Commodity Electricity, Gas and Drinking Water 
61 MCONST Import Commodity Construction 
62 MTRADE Import Commodity Trade 
63 MHOTEL Import Commodity Hotel and Restaurant 
64 MLNDTRN Import Commodity Land Transportation 
65 MWTRTRN Import Commodity Water Transportation 
66 MAIRTRN Import Commodity Air Transportation 
67 MCOMMU Import Commodity Communications 
68 MFINAN Import Commodity Finance 
69 MPUBSRV Import Commodity Public Services 
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No. Abbreviation Category Description 
70 MOTHSRV Import Commodity Other Services 
71 ROW Rest of the world Rest of the world 
72 FXRES Financial Instrument Government's Forex Reserves  
73 MONEY Financial Instrument Currency 
74 CHKACC Financial Instrument Demand Deposit 
75 SAVACC Financial Instrument Saving Deposit 
76 TIMEDEP Financial Instrument Time Deposit 
77 BICERT Financial Instrument Central Bank Certificate (SBI) 
78 GBOND Financial Instrument Government Bonds 
79 LONGSEC Financial Instrument Other Long-Term Securities 
80 SHRTSEC Financial Instrument Short-term Securities 
81 WCAPCR Financial Instrument Working Capital Credit 
82 INVCR Financial Instrument Investment Credit 
83 CONSCR Financial Instrument Consumption Credit 
84 NBANKCR Financial Instrument Non-Bank Credit 
85 TRDCR Financial Instrument Trade Credit 
86 SHARE Financial Instrument Equity & Share 
87 INSPRES Financial Instrument Insurance, Pension Fund Reserves 
88 OTHFIN Financial Instrument Others 
 
List of Equations 
1. Import Price 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝐺𝐺 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶 
2. Export Price 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶 
3. Value Added Price 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉 = 1𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟,𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 � �𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉�𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓 �
1
1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
 
4. Price of Total Output 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 = 1𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 ��𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉 �1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 �1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋� 11−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋 
5. Domestic Good Price 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 = 1𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 ��𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  �(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �1+𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 + �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹)1+𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇
+ �𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹�−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁)1+𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇� 11+𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  
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6. Composite Good Price 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 = 1𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 ��𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 + �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  ((1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺)1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉
+ �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁)1−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉� 11−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 
7. Wages 
𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 � 𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉0𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟�1−𝑙𝑙𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 � 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 𝑋𝑋0𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟⁄∑ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙 ∑ 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀0𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙⁄ �𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 
8. Price of Labor 
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 = 𝑝𝑝0𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖
 
9. Factor Demand 
𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎝
⎜
⎛ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉 �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 𝜃𝜃𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹
⎠
⎟
⎞
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
10. Demand for Value Added Good 
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
11. Demand for Intermediate Inputs 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑋𝑋
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
12. Total Output 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇+1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
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13. Demand for International Exported Good 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇+1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝐹𝐹
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
14. Demand for Domestic Exported Good 
𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑇𝑇 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇+1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
−𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
15. Demand for Domestic Good 
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
16. Demand for International Imported Good 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄(1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺)𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
17. Demand for Domestic Imported Good 
𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉−1𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
18. Direct Tax 
𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2.𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2 
19. Indirect Tax 
𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
20. Subsidy 
𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
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21. Import Tariff 
𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺�𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟
 
22. Factor Income 
𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟 = �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖
+ ��𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟
 
23. Government Income 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = ��𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟2,𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟2
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟2
+ � �𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2+ 𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙����𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟2�
𝑟𝑟2
+ 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖�
𝑖𝑖
− 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙��𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟
 
24. Non-Government Income 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟 = ��𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟2,𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟2
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟2
+ � �𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
 
25. Foreign Income 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 = ��𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑟𝑟2,𝑓𝑓𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟2
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟2
+ 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟+ ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
 
26. Disposable Income 
𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 = �1 −𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟� �𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 −��𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
�
−��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟2,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟2
−��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟
 
27. Households expenditure 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 + ��𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙.𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
+ ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟2.𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟2+ ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟.𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑟𝑟,𝐻𝐻
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟
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28. Government expenditure 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟
+ � �𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
 
29. Non-household and non-government expenditure 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻,𝑟𝑟 = ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙.𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
 
30. Foreign expenditure 
𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 = 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟��𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟
+ ��𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟.𝑓𝑓,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟+ ��𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙.𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
 
31. Saving 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 
32. Total Saving 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 = ��𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
 
33. Foreign Saving 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉.𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶 = ��𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟,𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟
𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟
 
34. Institutional Transfer 
𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2= 𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2+ 𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2+ 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2 
35. Government Transfer 
𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 = 𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙,𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 
36. Financial Return Transfer 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇ℎ,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2 = 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒2ℎ,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2 � 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛
 
37. Consumption Demand 
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = ��𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,ℎ𝑜𝑜 𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶ℎ,𝑟𝑟
ℎ
� 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄�  
 92 
 
38. Investment Demand 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
 
39. Total Investment 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 = ��𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
+ 𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾 
40. Domestic Investment Supply 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 = 𝜆𝜆0𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 ��𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟
�
𝜆𝜆1𝑖𝑖 (1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼)𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖  
41. Average Interest Rate 
𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 = ���𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
� ��𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
�  
42. Intermediate Good Demand 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = ��𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟2,𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟2
𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟2
+ �𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟,𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗,𝑟𝑟
𝑗𝑗
 
43. Market Clearing for Intra-National Trade 
�𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟
= �𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟
 
44. Market Clearing Condition 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐾𝐾𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 
 
45. Factor Supply 
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑟𝑟 = �𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖
 
 
46. Labor Supply 
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃 = (1 + 𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶)��𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙,𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙
 
47. Regional Real GDP 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 = �𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 − 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖
 
 
 93 
 
48. Regional Nominal GDP 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 = �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟𝑄𝑄 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖
 
49. Price Index 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑋𝑋 = ∑ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
∑ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
 
50. Stock of Assets 
𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 + 𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 
51. Stock of Liabilities 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 
52. Stock of Fix Assets 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 
53. Stock of Wealth 
𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 + 𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 
54. Flow of Fix Assets 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = �𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾 
55. Flow of Wealth 
𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = �𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
 
56. Demand of Assets 
𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝜃𝜃1𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 � 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛0𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝜎𝜎1𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
57. Demand of Liabilities 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = 𝜃𝜃2𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 � 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛0𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠�𝜎𝜎2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
58. Money Demand 
𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ��𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
�
𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟1𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛)−𝛼𝛼3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
59. Financial Account Balance 
�𝐴𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
+ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 = �𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN REGIONAL ECONOMY:  
THE CASE OF INDONESIA 
 
 
3.1 Background 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model (DSGE model) is more 
consistent with economic theory compared to the traditional econometric model because 
it is a micro-founded model constructed based on the behavior optimization of every 
agent that included in the model. That is why DSGE model is resistant to Lucas 
Critique, which predicts that the effect of economic policy cannot entirely depend on 
historical data. In DSGE, it is assumed that in the long-run when there are no more 
shocks, the economy goes to the steady state level. DSGE model generates a unique 
equilibrium path as the shocks are imposed to the model. Every point in this path 
represents the equilibrium condition after every agent in the model behaves optimally 
and interacts with other agents.  
If we compare with Computable General Equilibrium model (CGE model), 
DSGE model is more advanced since it is dynamic and stochastic, unlike the CGE 
which is static and deterministic. However, both models are micro-founded on 
assumptions about preferences, technology, and budget constraints. CGE model more 
focuses on the long-run relationships because the data used are just a snapshot of the 
particular period usually yearly and this data will define the structural of the economy. 
On the other hand, DSGE focus on the dynamic of the economy over time and the 
structure of the economy depends on the series of data and the expert judgment.  
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In common macro-econometric and CGE model, monetary policy is assumed to 
be exogenous or is defined outside the model. In this case, there is no feedback effect of 
the monetary policy in next period. In contrast, standard DSGE model does not assume 
this. Monetary policy is an endogenously model based on Taylor rule, such that 
monetary policy will respond to some economic conditions after shock was imposed. In 
the case of Taylor rule, they are inflation gap and output gap. Given this feature, we can 
generate the optimal policy responds given the shock. 
The economist in central bank mostly used DSGE model to analyze and evaluate 
macroeconomic policy or even to forecast some key macroeconomic variables for more 
than two years ahead. This model usually produces analysis for the national level. At 
national level, it assumed that the effect of a policy is uniform across regions in a 
country. This is not true if the economic structure of each region is different. Therefore, 
the regional DSGE model is more appropriate for a country like Indonesia that has 
many regions with different economic structure.  
In DSGE modeling, disaggregating national level into regional level would be 
very complicated because the system of equations will grow about n times, where n is 
the number of regions that are introduced into the model. As the system of equations is 
getting bigger, it is hard to get the stability of the system since the model is dynamic 
and the equations can contain forward and backward looking variables. That is why the 
two-region DSGE model is constructed for each region, wherein every model there are 
one particular region and the rest of the region. For example, in Sumatra DSGE model, 
there are Sumatra region, and the region outside Sumatra, which contains Java and Bali, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Eastern Indonesia. 
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This study aims to construct five regional DSGE models and tries to estimate the 
optimal monetary policy of each regional DSGE model and then analyze how central 
bank as a monetary authority should react to the regional shocks. Moreover, it also 
wants to address the question of how the disaggregation of the national model into the 
regional model is necessary by comparing the results between those two models. 
Besides the monetary policy, the model also provides the optimal local government 
expenditure in the region. Thus, the central bank optimal policy in this model is the 
optimal response given the government optimal fiscal policy. 
According to Tamegawa (2012) in term of economic geography namely 
integration, agglomeration and etc., this DSGE model is comparable to the model called 
New Economic Geography (NEG) models, which are critical for analyzing economic 
geography. However, the DSGE model has at least one advantage namely agent’s 
forward-looking behavior. This feature might be not interesting for regional analysis, 
but this is needed for a discussion of dynamic regional model based on DSGE at least to 
obtain robustness in policy analysis. Their model incorporates several extensions to 
standard DSGE model because the effect of fiscal policy on the consumption is negative 
which is not supported by many empirical studies. These extensions include non-
Ricardian households (Gali et al., 2007) and “deep habit” (Ravn et al., 2006), a utility 
that strengthens the complementary between labor and consumption. 
 The proposed model is built based on a standard small open economy 
framework by Gali and Monacelli (2008). They created DSGE model for the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy 
in a currency union and also to study its implications for the optimal design of such 
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policies. In their model, they incorporate nominal rigidities that have been used recently 
for monetary policy analysis. Their model also contains a fiscal policy sector by 
allowing for a country-specific level of public consumption, and lastly, it comprises 
many small open economies linked by trade and financial flows. Their model can be 
implemented for the purpose of analysis because Indonesia as a country with a single 
currency has many regions that are analogous to the countries in the EMU, where each 
region has its own region-specific fiscal policy and are linked by trade and financial 
flows. However, there is only one monetary policy that will affect those regions 
simultaneously. 
 As mentioned earlier, separated two-region DSGE model is constructed for each 
region. Each model emphasized on the regional economy inside Indonesia; it is 
assumed that the rest of world is constant. Thus, each region is considered as a small 
open economy to the rest of the region nationally, but it is closed economy to the rest of 
the world. 
 The original Gali Monacelli (2008) model is modified such that it can match the 
reality better.  This modification includes backward looking Phillip Curve, backward 
looking of Taylor rule, and introducing monetary aggregate through utility function. 
The first one can be done by adding indexation mechanism which nominal prices are 
indexed to past inflation in the aggregate price level. This feature can accommodate the 
probability of firms who did not re-optimize their prices when they set the prices. The 
second one is also important to provide the behavior of central bank as it tends to 
smooth its interest rate. The last one is necessary for policy makers to manage the 
dynamics of a monetary aggregate. In addition, the Taylor rule not only depends on 
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inflation gap, the difference between current inflation to its target, but also depends on 
output gap, the difference between GDP and its potential. This feature reflects the 
tradeoff of the policy makers between inflation and GDP. 
The main advantage of this model is the estimation of the parameters using 
Bayesian estimation procedure. It allows heterogeneity across the region in terms of 
economic structure because each region has its own set of parameters that match the 
reality. This procedure not only estimates the parameters but also calculates the 
standard error of the shocks. After the estimation process has been conducted, the 
model is simulated to check the impulse response of each shock. Then, the optimum 
Taylor rule can be calculated by minimizing objective/loss function subject to some 
constraints given the estimated parameters and standard errors. Since this study focuses 
on what the optimal monetary policy when there are regional shocks, only shocks come 
from the region are included in the minimization process. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis 
The current central bank’s monetary policy as a response to a regional shock 
might be not optimal. It is possible to find the optimal policy which maximizes the 
central bank’s objective function given the optimal government’s fiscal policy.  
When a regional shock hits the economy, the disaggregation of the national level 
model into regional level model becomes important. It is because the policy 
recommendation produced by the national model and the regional model might be 
different. This difference could hurt some agents and regions in the economy.  In 
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addition, the regional model is expected to be more optimal than the national one in 
terms of loss function.  
 
3.3 Literature Review 
 The idea of DSGE model was started with a seminal paper by Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) modeling post-war U.S. economy and introducing Real Business Cycle 
model (RBC model). Since then, DSGE model has become a popular tool for many 
fields of economic studies especially international economics and macroeconomics to 
address the problems in economic growth, business cycle, monetary policy, fiscal 
policy, etc. 
 In the broad field of macroeconomic models, there are two types of frameworks 
namely RBC model, and New Keynesian model (NK model). The former is to study 
business cycle fluctuations based on neoclassical growth model and assumed perfect 
competitions. Therefore, the prices are flexible. The latter assumed imperfect 
competitions in goods and labor market which allows price rigidities that are introduced 
via sticky prices and wages. In the early 1990s, the economists started to combine those 
two types of frameworks called new neoclassical synthesis, which essentially combined 
the dynamic aspects of RBC model with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities of 
the new Keynesian model. 
 The research on monetary policy using the new neoclassical synthesis becomes 
popular at the central bank in the last few years. Some central bank has its own name of 
the DSGE model, for example Bank Indonesia (ARIMBI / Aggregate Rational 
Inflation-targeting Model for Bank Indonesia), Norges Bank (NEMO / Norwegian 
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Economy Model), Bank of Canada (ToTEM / Terms of Trade Economic Model), Bank 
of England (BEQM / Bank of England Quarterly Model), Central Bank of Chile (MAS / 
Model of Analysis and Simulation), European Central Bank (NAWN / New Area-Wide 
Model), Sveriges Riksbank (RAMSES / Riskbanks Aggregated Macro model for 
Studies of the Economy in Sweden), etc. 
 In Indonesia, Bank Indonesia has been developing its DSGE model since 2000 
named GEMBI (General Equilibrium Model of Bank Indonesia) by Joseph, Dewandaru, 
and Ari (2000). This model was improving every year until 2007. In 2009, BISMA 
(Bank Indonesia Structural MAcro model) was built by Waluyo (2009) only for policy 
simulation because it is very theoretical. In 2010, ARIMBI was developed by 
Harmanta, Bathaludin and Waluyo (2010) to do both policy simulation and forecast 
model. Now, ARIMBI is the primary model in Bank Indonesia to simulate and forecast 
the policy and aggregated macro variables and then collaborate with an economic model 
named SOFIE (ShOrt-term Forecast Model For Indonesian Economy) to disaggregate 
those forecast variables into more detail variables. This model includes both real and 
financial sector. However, these models are still at the national level where all the 
variables are in national macro-aggregated. 
 Most of the models above are single-country DSGE model. However, some 
economists also interested in building multi-country DSGE model to see the interaction 
between countries, for example, Dieppe, Pandiella and Willman (2011) developed 
NMCM (New Multi-Country Model) for the Euro Area. Their model is intended for 
doing scenario analysis and forecast for European Central Bank, and it covers the five 
largest euro area countries. They show the evidence of heterogeneity across countries 
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and that the effect of the shocks to economies depends on whether the shocks are pre-
announced, announced and credible or unannounced and uncredible. However, since the 
model is estimated with GMM (Generalized Method of Moments), it is assumed that 
optimizing agents are boundedly rational in knowing only parameters related to their 
problem and not the rest of the model. This assumption might not reflect the real world. 
There are few papers discussed regional economy using DSGE model. 
Tamegawa (2012) in his study explains how to construct N region DSGE model, and he 
simulates the effects of fiscal policy on the economy by using two-region DSGE model. 
His model has interaction between small region and rest of the regions through trade. 
However, this model assumed no monetary policy. He found that the fiscal expansion is 
largest if the more solvent government implements the policy in a region where social 
capital is productive, and the number of non-Ricardian households is large. Moreover, 
he also demonstrated that a sudden rise in the interest rate of government bonds as 
results of a sudden increase in probability of government default could lead to a 
decrease in national output.  
Okano et. al. (2015) constructed DSGE model to examine Japan’s Kansai region 
to find out the causes of its long-run economic stagnation. Their model has two type of 
firms namely durable and nondurable producers, and it has a monetary and fiscal policy, 
which comprises local and central government. However, they model the region using 
single-country closed economy model and split the government expenditure into local 
and central government using fix ratio. There is no interdependent relationship with 
another economy, even with other regions. In other words, it is similar to imposing 
regional dataset into single country DSGE model. The simulation results showed that 
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the structural problems related to the Kansai region stagnation are stagnant private 
residential and equipment investments and productivity persistence. 
In general, the procedure of solving DSGE model involves the setup of the 
model with some assumptions, derivation of the first-order conditions from all the 
optimization problems which produce system of non-linear equations, then the 
linearization of this system of equations which is approximated in the neighborhood of 
the non-stochastic steady state since the system of equations usually does not have a 
closed analytical solution. The approximation around the steady-state using (log-linear) 
approximation produces a system of linear difference equations in the state-space form. 
Next, the parameters are calibrated by utilizing actual dataset for share type parameters, 
borrowing parameters from other models that have the same characteristics, and/or 
getting from expert’s judgments. The more sophisticated way to get the parameters is by 
estimation process using Bayesian methods. These methods allow both data and 
judgment to be considered in the estimation process. 
The use of Bayesian methods in DSGE models began in the late 1990s. Before 
that, the classical optimization methods were used by macroeconomists to estimate 
DSGE model. Macroeconomists prefer to use Bayesian methods even though DSGE 
model can be estimated using classical optimization methods. One reason is that 
frequentist econometrics often find challenging to estimate a wide variety of macro 
models. Another reason is that advances in Bayesian theory are giving an expanding 
array of tools that researchers can utilize to estimate DSGE model. The availability of a 
modern computer with high computational power makes Bayesian approach popular 
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because the estimation of medium to large-scale DSGE model using Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulators are feasible.  
 
3.4 Bayesian Estimation 
The recent DSGE models usually do not have a closed-form solution. Therefore, 
researchers try to obtain an approximate solution by applying first-order Taylor 
approximation or log-linearization procedure on the DSGE model around its non-
stochastic steady state. The log-deviations of a variable from its steady state is denoted 
by “ � ” symbol, or defined as 𝑥𝑥� = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − ?̅?𝑥 or 𝑥𝑥� = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−?̅?𝑥?̅?𝑥 , where that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 and  ?̅?𝑥 are the 
logarithmic level and the logarithmic steady state of 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡, respectively. 
Bayesian estimation of the linear approximate DSGE model uses Kalman filter 
to construct the likelihood of DSGE model. The state-space representation of DSGE 
model consists of the system of state equations, 
 𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡 = 𝔽𝔽𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡−1 + ℚ𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡,  𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺(𝟎𝟎, 𝐈𝐈𝑜𝑜), (3.1) 
and the system of observation equations, 
 𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡 = ℍ𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡 + 𝜉𝜉𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡,  𝜉𝜉𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺(𝟎𝟎, Σ𝑢𝑢) (3.2) 
where 𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡is the vector of states, 𝔽𝔽 and ℚ are function of the matrices,  𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡 is the vector of 
observables, ℍ is zero and one matrix relates to the definition of model with the data,  
𝜉𝜉𝑡𝑡 is the vector of structural innovation, and 𝜉𝜉𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of measurement errors. The 
likelihood of the linearized DSGE model can be formulated from the state-space 
representation above as follows 
 ℒ(𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇|Θ) = �ℒ(𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝒴𝒴𝑡𝑡−1,Θ)𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
 (3.3) 
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where ℒ(𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝒴𝒴𝑡𝑡−1,Θ) is the likelihood conditional on past information available up to 
𝑑𝑑 − 1 and 𝒴𝒴𝑡𝑡−1 ≡ {𝕐𝕐0,𝕐𝕐1, … ,𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡−1}. Let define 𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 as the conditional expectation of 
𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡 given {𝕊𝕊1, … ,𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡−1} and its mean square error is 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 ≡ 𝔼𝔼[(𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡 − 𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡−1)(𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡 −
𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡−1)′]. Then, Kalman filter is calculated the likelihood by the following steps: 
1. Set the initial value, 𝕊𝕊1|0 = 0, and 𝑃𝑃1|0 = 𝔽𝔽𝑃𝑃0|0𝔽𝔽′ + 𝒬𝒬′, where 𝒬𝒬′ = ℚℚ′ 
2. Calculate 𝕐𝕐1|0 = ℍ′𝕊𝕊1|0 = 0, Ω1|0 = 𝔼𝔼 ��𝕐𝕐1 − 𝕐𝕐1|0��𝕐𝕐1 − 𝕐𝕐1|0�′� =
ℍ′𝑃𝑃1|0ℍ + Σ𝑢𝑢 
3. From step 1 and 2, the prediction of period 1 likelihood is 
ℒ(𝕐𝕐1|Θ) = (2𝜋𝜋)−𝑜𝑜 2⁄ �Ω1|0−1 �1 2⁄ 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �− 12 �𝕐𝕐1′ Ω1|0−1𝕐𝕐1�� 
4.  Update the period 1 forecasts 
 𝕊𝕊1|1 = 𝕊𝕊1|0 + 𝑃𝑃1|0ℍΩ1|0−1�𝕐𝕐1 − 𝕐𝕐1|0� 
𝑃𝑃1|1 = 𝑃𝑃1|0 − 𝑃𝑃1|0ℍΩ1|0−1ℍ′𝑃𝑃1|0 
5. Do step 2 until 4 again to get Kalman filter predictions of 𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡 and 𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡 
𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝔽𝔽𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡−1ℙ𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 
ℙ𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝔽𝔽ℙ𝑡𝑡−1|𝑡𝑡−1𝔽𝔽′ + ℚ′ 
𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = ℍ′𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 
Ω𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝔼𝔼 ��𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡 − 𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1��𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡 − 𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1�′� = ℍ′ℙ𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1ℍ + Σ𝑢𝑢 
 the likelihood is calculated by  
ℒ(𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝒴𝒴𝑡𝑡−1,Θ) = (2𝜋𝜋)−𝑜𝑜 2⁄ �Ω𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1−1 �1 2⁄ 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �− 12 �𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡 − 𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1�′Ω𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1−1 �𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡 − 𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1�� 
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then the state vector and its mean square error for period 𝑑𝑑 = 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 can be 
updated using 
𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡 = 𝕊𝕊𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1ℍΩ𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1−1 �𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡 − 𝕐𝕐𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1� 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1ℍΩ𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1−1 ℍ′𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 
The likelihood of the linearized DSGE model is computed using the likelihood in step 2 
and 5 above, and then in the first stage, the parameters are estimated that maximized the 
likelihood in equation (3.3). 
 In order to incorporate priors in the Bayesian estimation procedure, the 
parameter vector Θ is divided into two parts: the priors, Θ1, which contains the 
parameters which are to be estimated; and Θ2, which consists of the fixed or calibrated 
parameters. The priors and the calibrated parameters are discussed in more detail in the 
priors and calibrated parameters section later.  
  In the second stage, after the parameters are estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimator, the posterior distribution of the DSGE model parameters in Θ1 is 
simulated using the MH-MCMC algorithm. The estimated parameters in the first stage 
are used as initial parameters for MH-MCMC algorithm. These parameters are passed 
to Kalman filter procedure to get the estimated ℒ(𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇|Θ1;Θ2). The MH random walk 
law of motion updates the initial parameters and put the updated parameters back to 
Kalman filter to generate a second estimate of the likelihood function. The MH 
algorithm decides whether the proposed update of Θ1 and its likelihood go to next step. 
Next given this decision, the MH algorithm is trying to obtain new proposed update of 
Θ1 using MH random walk law of motion and generate an estimate of corresponding 
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likelihood. The new likelihood is compared to the previous likelihood to select the Θ1 
and likelihood for the next MH step. In order to generate the posterior of linear 
approximate DSGE model, 𝒫𝒫(Θ1|𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇;Θ2), this procedure needs to be repeated ℋ times. 
 In more details, the MH-MCMC algorithm can be written as follows: 
1.  Initialize the MH algorithm Θ�1,0 using the parameters estimated in the first 
stage from maximum likelihood estimator. 
2. Put these parameters Θ�1,0 into Kalman filter procedure to produce an initial 
estimate of the likelihood of the DSGE model, ℒ�𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇|Θ�1,0;Θ2� 
3. Generate the proposed update of Θ�1,0 which is Θ1,1 using the random walk law 
of motion of MH, Θ1,1 = Θ�1,0 + 𝜛𝜛𝜛𝜛𝜀𝜀1, 𝜀𝜀1~𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺(𝟎𝟎𝑡𝑡, 𝑰𝑰𝑡𝑡), where 𝜛𝜛 is a scalar 
which indicates the size of the “jump” of the proposed MH random walk update, 
𝜛𝜛 is the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of Θ1, and 𝑑𝑑 is the 
dimension of Θ1. Then, compute the ℒ�𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇|Θ1,0;Θ2� by employing Θ1,1 as input. 
4. There are two-stage procedure to decide whether to move to proposed update 
Θ1,1 or to stay with the initial value Θ�1,0. In the first stage calculate 
𝜔𝜔1 = min �ℒ�𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇|Θ1,1;Θ2�𝒫𝒫�Θ1,1�
ℒ�𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇|Θ�1,0;Θ2�𝒫𝒫�Θ�1,0� , 1� 
where 𝒫𝒫�Θ1,1� is the prior at Θ1,1. In the second stage, draw a uniform random 
variable 𝜑𝜑1~𝑈𝑈(0,1) to set Θ�1,1 = Θ1,1 and the counter ℂ = 1 if  𝜑𝜑1 ≤ 𝜔𝜔1, 
otherwise set Θ�1,1 = Θ�1,0 and ℂ = 0 
5.  Repeat step 3 and 4 for ℓ = 2,3, … ,ℋ by calculating the MH random walk law 
of motion  
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Θ1,ℓ = Θ�1,ℓ−1 + 𝜛𝜛𝜛𝜛𝜀𝜀ℓ, 𝜀𝜀ℓ~𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺(𝟎𝟎𝑡𝑡×1, 𝑰𝑰𝑡𝑡) 
 and draw again 𝜑𝜑ℓ~𝑈𝑈(0,1) to test again 
𝜔𝜔ℓ = min � ℒ�𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇|Θ1,ℓ;Θ2�𝒫𝒫�Θ1,ℓ�
ℒ�𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇|Θ�1,ℓ−1;Θ2�𝒫𝒫�Θ�1,ℓ−1� , 1� 
to set Θ�1,ℓ to either Θ1,ℓ or Θ�1,ℓ−1. The former implies ℂ = ℂ + 1, while the 
latter has ℂ = ℂ + 0. 
These five steps produce the posterior 𝒫𝒫�Θ�1|𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇;Θ2� by drawing �Θ�1,ℓ�ℓ=1ℋ . However, at 
least there are five main issues when running MH-MCMC algorithm, namely obtaining 
initial value Θ�1,0 for the MH-MCMC, setting 𝜛𝜛 which is the Cholesky decomposition of 
the covariance matrix of Θ1, determining ℋ, setting 𝜛𝜛 to get optimal acceptance rate 
ℂ ℋ⁄  for the proposal Θ1,ℓ, and checking the convergence of MH-MCMC simulator. 
 First, the initial value of the MH-MCMC can be obtained by using classical 
optimization methods and an MH-MCMC “burn-in” stage. A classical optimizer is 
repeatedly run to the likelihood of DSGE model with initial conditions found by 
sampling 100 times from 𝒫𝒫(Θ1). The initial condition for a “burn-in” stage of MH-
MCMC algorithm is taken from the mode of the posterior distribution of Θ1 in the 
classical optimization in previous step. This procedure needed to remove the 
dependence of 𝒫𝒫�Θ�1|𝒴𝒴𝑇𝑇;Θ2� on the initial condition Θ�1,0. To complete the “burn-in” 
stage, 10,000 MH steps are run using 𝜛𝜛 = 1 and 𝜛𝜛 = 𝐈𝐈𝑡𝑡. These steps produce an 
empirical estimate of the covariance matrix 𝜛𝜛𝜛𝜛′ which is used after the Cholesky 
decomposition for the source of 𝜛𝜛 for the MH law of motion. 
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 Determining  ℋ and 𝜛𝜛 are important because they affect the speed of 
convergence. The number of step or simulation, ℋ, should be sufficient such that the 
MH-MCMC simulation is convergence. In this model, 20,000 simulations are enough to 
allow for convergence. However, for large and more complicated DSGE model, it needs 
a lot more simulations. As for jump scale, 𝜛𝜛, Gelman et al (2004) suggest with 𝜛𝜛 =2.4 √𝑑𝑑⁄  to drive the acceptance rate ℂ ℋ⁄ ∈ [0.23,0.30] to get the most efficient MH 
law of motion. 
 The convergence of the MH-MCMC simulator can be checked by using 𝐶𝐶� 
statistic from Gelman et al. (2004). The 𝐶𝐶� statistic compares the variances of the 
elements within the sequence of �Θ�1,ℓ�𝓵𝓵=1𝓗𝓗  to the variances between the sequences 
produced with different initial conditions that are generated by the same methods above. 
According to Gelman et al (2004), the rule of thumb for convergence is when 𝐶𝐶� ≤ 1.1, 
if not, they suggest to increase ℋ until convergence is achieved.  
 
3.5 The Model 
Indonesia is modeled as a system consists of a continuum of regions represented 
by the unit interval. Each region is treated as a small open economy, indexed by 𝑖𝑖 ∈[0,1]. However, the whole model is considered closed economy since this research is 
only focus on the national interaction. The model in detail is described as follows: 
3.5.1 Households 
The model assume that a region is inhabited by an infinitely-lived representative 
household seeking to maximize 
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 max
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸0
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
� 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜒𝜒) log𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜒𝜒 log𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 + �𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �
1−𝜈𝜈
1 − 𝜈𝜈∞𝑡𝑡=0
⎭
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎫
 (3.4) 
subject to a sequence of the budget constraint of the form: 
 
� 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗1
0
+ � � 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓(𝑗𝑗)𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗1
0
𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓
1
0
+ 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
 
(3.5) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, and 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  are private consumption, hours of work, public consumption, 
and real money balance, respectively. 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓(𝑗𝑗) is the price of good j produced in region f. 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1
𝑖𝑖 is the nominal payoff in period t+1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t. 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
is the nominal wage, and 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is lump-sum taxes. 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1 is the stochastic discount factor 
for one-period ahead nominal payoffs, which is common across regions. Parameter 𝜒𝜒 ∈[0,1] measures the weight attached to public consumption. φ is the inverse of the 
elasticity of work effort with respect to the real wage or the inverse of the Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply. Finally, 𝜈𝜈 is the inverse of the elasticity of money holdings 
with respect to the interest rate. 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 is a composite consumption index defined by 
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 ≡
�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼�𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1−𝛼𝛼)𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼  (3.6) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is an index of region i's consumption of locally produced goods given by 
CES function 
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 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ �� 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)𝜖𝜖−1𝜖𝜖 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗1
0
�
𝜖𝜖
𝜖𝜖−1
 (3.7) 
where 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [0,1] denotes the type of good in region i. Variable 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is an index of region 
i's consumption of imported goods from other regions, given by: 
 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝� 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1
0
𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓 (3.8) 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = log𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 . The consumption of goods by region i's households that are 
produced by region f is 
 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ �� 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)𝜖𝜖−1𝜖𝜖 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗1
0
�
𝜖𝜖
𝜖𝜖−1
 (3.9) 
Region i’s public consumption index is given by 
 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ �� 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝜖𝜖−1𝜖𝜖 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗1
0
�
𝜖𝜖
𝜖𝜖−1
 (3.10) 
Notice that in the specification of preference described above 𝛼𝛼 ∈ [0,1] is the weight of 
imported goods in the utility of private consumption. Parameter 𝜖𝜖 > 1 denotes the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties produced within any given region, 
independently of the producing region. The optimal allocation of consumption in any 
given region is 
 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �−𝜖𝜖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  ; 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 �−𝜖𝜖 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.11) 
The price index for locally produced goods for all 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1] is given by 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡
�∫ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)1−𝜖𝜖𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗1
0
�
1
1−𝜖𝜖, and the price index for bundles of imported goods from region f is 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓 ≡ �∫ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓(𝑗𝑗)1−𝜖𝜖𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗1
0
�
1
1−𝜖𝜖. Therefore, ∫ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗10 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  and 
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∫ ∫ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓(𝑗𝑗)𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗10 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓10 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 . Moreover, the optimal allocation of consumption on 
imported goods by region of origin is: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  for all 𝑓𝑓 ∈ [0,1] (3.12) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ∫ 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓10  is the inter-regional trade price. Lastly, by defining the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) for region i as 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1−𝛼𝛼(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗)𝛼𝛼, the optimal allocation 
of consumption between local and imported goods in that region is 
                𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖;   𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.13) 
By using all those equations above, the budget constraint in equation (3.5) can be 
simplified as follows: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.14) 
 The optimality conditions for the maximization problem (3.4) subject to the 
budget constraint (3.14) are given by 
 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1−1 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 −1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 � = 1  (3.15) 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖φ(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 (3.16) 
 
�
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜈𝜈
(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (3.17) 
   
The first equation is a conventional Euler equation, where 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1−1 � = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, which is the 
(gross) nominal interest rate. The second and the last equation describe the relation 
between consumption and labor, consumption and real money balance, respectively. 
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Those three equations can be written in log-linear form as 
 ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 − �𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 − Etπc,t+1𝑖𝑖 � (3.18) 
 𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.19) 
 𝑚𝑚�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜈𝜈 ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 1(1 + 𝚤𝚤)̅𝜈𝜈 𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 (3.20) 
The detailed derivation and linearization can be seen in Appendix. 
3.5.2 Terms of Trade 
The bilateral term of trade between regions i and f is defined as 
 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.21) 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓is the price of good produced in region f. The effective terms of trade for regions i 
are thus given by 
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝� �log𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 − log𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓1
0
= 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝� log 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓1
0
 (3.22) 
From this equation, we know that 
 Δ𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.23) 
Notice that the CPI and the domestic price levels are related according to 
 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝛼𝛼 (3.24) 
Hence, the CPI inflation are linked according to 
 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼Δ𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.25) 
where 𝛼𝛼 represents the degree of openness. Using the definition of the effective terms of 
trade above, alternatively, CPI inflation can be calculated as the weighted average 
between locally produced goods’ inflation and the rest of regions’ inflation, as follows 
 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ (3.26) 
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3.5.3 National Risk Sharing 
 By assuming complete market for state-contingent securities across the region, 
the Euler equation analogous to equation (3.15)  for representative households in any 
other region, say region f  
 1 = 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1−1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑓𝑓 −1
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓−1
� (3.27) 
By combining both Euler equation (3.15) and (3.27), we can derive 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝜛𝜛𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓�𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼 
where 𝜛𝜛𝑓𝑓 is some constant that will generally depend on initial conditions regarding 
relative net asset positions. Without loss of generality, let assume symmetric initial 
conditions, i.e. zero net foreign assets holdings and ex-ante identical environment. This 
implies 𝜛𝜛𝑓𝑓 = 𝜛𝜛 = 1 ∀𝑓𝑓. Taking logs and integrating over f yields 
 ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.28) 
where ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ ≡ ∫ ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓
1
0
 is the rest of region consumption, and ?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ ∫ ?̂?𝑔𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓10  
3.5.4 Firm 
Each region has a continuum of firms represented by the interval [0,1]. For 
simplicity, each firm produces a differentiated good with a linear technology: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) (3.29) 
for all 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 ∈ [0,1], where 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is a region-specific productivity shifter. Let define the 
aggregate output, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ �∫ 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝜖𝜖−1𝜖𝜖10 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗� 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖−1. Thus, the aggregate labor hired is given by 
 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = � 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗1
0
= 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖  (3.30) 
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 where 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = ∫ 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗10 . The equilibrium variations of 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = log𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 around the steady 
state as shown in Appendix are of second order approximation. Therefore, the first 
order approximation of the aggregate output for 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1] is 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.31) 
The region-specific productivity is assumed to follow AR(1) process (in logs): 
 𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.32) 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = log𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,1] and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is white noise. 
3.5.5 Price setting 
The firms are assumed to set prices in a staggered price fashion, as in Calvo 
(1983). Hence, some firms choose not to reoptimize their price, and some others 
reoptimize their price. The former uses lagged inflation for their next period price and 
the latter sets an entirely new price 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 for next period. 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗){. } is the cost function 
as a function of output 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗). The objective function of the firms in setting up the price 
is 
 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
�
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) − 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)��  (3.33) 
and the law of motion of the aggregate price is given by 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = �𝜃𝜃�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 �1−𝜀𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1−𝜀𝜀� 11−𝜀𝜀 (3.34) 
A measure 1 − 𝜃𝜃 of (randomy selected) firms sets new prices each period, with 
an individual firm’s probability of re-optimizing in any given period being independent 
of time elapsed since it last reset its price. So, on average firms reoptimize their price 
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every 1 (1 − 𝜃𝜃)⁄  periods in a year. As is well known, the inflation equation can be 
obtained as follows: 
 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖��1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝛽𝛽) 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.35) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the real marginal cost. 
 The real marginal cost in the linear technology production function is given by 
 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 � + �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.36) 
Combining equation (3.19), (3.24), (3.31) and (3.39) we can rewrite equation (3.36) as 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = � 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜑𝜑�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − (1 + 𝜑𝜑)𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
Thus, the final inflation equation is 
 
𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 1(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
+ (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝛽𝛽) �� 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜑𝜑�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − (1 + 𝜑𝜑)𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 
 
(3.37) 
3.5.6 Market Clearing 
The market clearing condition for good j produced in region i is 
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) + � 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 (𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓1
0
+ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) (3.38) 
This equation shows that output of region i, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗), should equal the sum of consumption 
goods of region i produced locally, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗), total export goods for other regions produced 
in region i, ∫ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 (𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓10 , and public goods of region i. 
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 Using the definition of region i’s aggregate output, 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �∫ 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝜖𝜖−1𝜖𝜖10 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗� 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖−1 and 
equation (3.38), the market clearing condition can be written as 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝛼𝛼 + 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
Log-linearize around the steady state yields: 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)�?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.39) 
By aggregating over all regions and solve for ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ yields 
 ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ = 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡∗ (3.40) 
Combining equation (3.18), (3.28) and (3.40) produces the region i's consumption 
  ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡+1∗ − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡+1∗ + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
− �𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 − Etπc,t+1𝑖𝑖 � (3.41) 
Using the log of (3.24) and integrating it, equation (3.39) can be written as 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝛾𝛾)�𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗� (3.42) 
Integrating it yields 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡∗ = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡∗ (3.43) 
where 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡∗ ≡ ∫ 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
1
0
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, and 𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡∗ ≡ ∫ 𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
1
0
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖. Finally, integrating equation (3.18) for all 
regions and combining with (3.43) yields the aggregate dynamic IS equation: 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡∗ = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡+1∗ − (1 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 − Etπt+1∗ ) − 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡∆𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡+1∗  (3.44) 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗ ≡ ∫ 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
1
0
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖. 
3.5.7 Monetary Policy 
To improve social welfare, the central bank faces a trade-off between 
maintaining price stability and output stability relative to its potential. Based on Philips 
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Curve, the central bank has a preference to decrease the inflation rate, so the real output 
drops as well. This condition creates this trade-off as mentioned before.  
Since July 2005, Bank Indonesia has been implementing Inflation Targeting 
Framework (ITF) and the monetary policy transmission through the interest rate 
channel and expectation channel is believed to be strong in Indonesia. In this case, we 
will implement Taylor rule interest rate reaction function as a mechanism to set the 
interest rate in the short-run. Taylor rule is a monetary-policy response from the central 
bank that considers both inflation target achievement and minimizing social cost. It is 
assumed that Bank Indonesia as a monetary authority has a higher preference in 
lowering inflation rate than output stability relative to potential output. 
 According to this framework, the central bank objective function is to set the 
short-run nominal interest rate, 𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡, such that it minimizes the deviation between inflation 
and its target, which is inflation gap, and also reduces the difference between output and 
its potential, which is output gap. The formula of Taylor rule is as follows: 
 𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖)�𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋(𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1) + 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡� + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡?̂?𝚤 (3.45) 
where 𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 is short-run nominal interest rate gap that represents the gap between policy 
rate and its long-run trend, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1 is the expected CPI inflation gap one period ahead 
that indicates the gap between inflation and its long-run trend, y�t is the output gap (the 
gap between output and its potential) and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡?̂?𝚤 is the error term (exogenous shock). 
Parameter 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 represents the interest rate smoothing with previous period of the interest 
rate. Moreover, α𝜋𝜋 > 1 and αy are the preference parameter for inflation gap and output 
gap, respectively. 
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3.5.8 Fiscal Policy 
Government as a fiscal authority has an objective to maximize the aggregate 
welfare of households, which is reflected by the aggregate utility function of the 
households. In Appendix, the aggregate welfare loss function is derived using the 
second order approximation to the average utility losses of the aggregated households, 
expressed as fluctuations about the efficient steady state can be written as: 
 𝕎𝕎𝑡𝑡 = −12�𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡∞
𝑡𝑡=0
� �
𝜀𝜀
𝜆𝜆
�𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
2 + (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�2�10 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 (3.46) 
where the last term indicates the fiscal gap. Thus, in another word, the sum of welfare 
losses is trying to minimize the fluctuation of inflation, output gap, and fiscal gap. 
 Under the assumption of no commitment or discretion case, the optimal fiscal 
policy is derived by minimizing the period loss function 
 � �
𝜀𝜀
𝜆𝜆
�𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
2 + (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�2�10 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 (3.47) 
subject to the set of constraints 
 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝛽𝛽) � 11 − 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜑𝜑�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝛾𝛾(1 + 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.48) 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.49) 
where 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡
1(1+𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(1+𝛽𝛽)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖  and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝛾𝛾)�𝚤𝚤?̂?𝑡 − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � − 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖  
are taken as given by the policymaker because of the discretion case. After rearranging 
the FOCs, the optimal fiscal policy takes the form: 
 𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = −φ𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝜑𝜑(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.50) 
All detailed step for deriving the optimal fiscal policy can be seen in Appendix. 
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3.6 Data 
The observed data that are used in the estimation process are national and 
regional CPI inflation, national and regional real GDP, national and regional real 
government expenditure, and interest rate. These data are taken from CEIC, and it is 
quarterly data ranging from the first quarter of 2002 until the second quarter of 2016. 
Since the variables in the model are in deviation from the steady state, the data 
used in the model is in the gap from its trend. The gap data are obtained by using HP 
filter procedure. Before using this filter, the data are seasonally adjusted using Census 
X12 because the raw data is still seasonal. 
 
3.7 Calibration and Priors 
Some parameters in the model are calibrated, and some others are estimated. As 
discussed in the previous section, the estimation process needs priors combined with the 
actual data. Both priors and calibrated parameters are taken from the inter-regional 
social accounting matrix (IRSAM), from the empirical results of others research in 
Indonesia and also research from other countries that have similar economic structure, 
or even from the expertise judgments.  
Table 3.1  Priors and Calibrated Parameters 
 
No Para-meters Description Type Value Implication Source 
1 𝛽𝛽 Discount Factor Calibrated 0.99 
Annual return 
about 4% in 
steady state 
Gali 
Monacelli 
(2008) 
2 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 
Autoregressive 
process for labor 
productivity Calibrated 0.95 
Persistent 
productivity 
shock 
King 
Rebelo 
(1999) 
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No Para-meters Description Type Value Implication Source 
3 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡∗  
Autoregressive 
process for labor 
productivity Calibrated 0.95 
Persistent 
productivity 
shock 
King 
Rebelo 
(1999) 
4 𝛼𝛼1 
Degree of 
openness of region 
1 Prior * - 
IRSAM 
Table 
5 𝜃𝜃1 
The probability of 
firms that are not 
setting a new price 
in region 1 Prior 0.75 
Price 
adjustment 
every quarter 
Gali 
Monacelli 
(2008) 
6 𝜑𝜑1 
The inverse of the 
elasticity of the 
effort of work 
with respect to the 
real wage in 
region 1 Prior 3 
A labor 
supply 
elasticity of 
1/3 
Gali 
Monacelli 
(2008) 
7 𝜖𝜖1 
The elasticity of 
substitution 
between different 
goods in region 1 Prior 6 
A steady state 
markup 𝜇𝜇 =1.2 Gali Monacelli (2008) 
8 𝜈𝜈1 
The inverse of the 
elasticity of 
money with 
respect to the 
interest rate in 
region 1 Prior 1 
Consumption 
elasticity in 
money 
demand is 1 
Gali 
(2008) 
9 𝜃𝜃∗ 
The probability of 
firms that are not 
setting a new price 
for the rest of the 
region Prior 0.75 
Price 
adjustment 
every quarter 
Gali 
Monacelli 
(2008) 
10 𝜑𝜑∗ 
The inverse of the 
elasticity of the 
effort of work 
with respect to the 
real wage in the 
rest of the region Prior 3 
A labor 
supply 
elasticity of 
1/3 
Gali 
Monacelli 
(2008) 
11 𝜖𝜖∗ 
The elasticity of 
substitution 
between different 
goods in the rest 
of the region Prior 6 
A steady state 
markup of 1.2 
Gali 
Monacelli 
(2008) 
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No Para-meters Description Type Value Implication Source 
12 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋 
Inflation gap 
parameter in 
Taylor rule Prior 1.5 
Must be 
greater than 1 
for unique 
equilibrium 
Gali 
Monacelli 
(2008) 
13 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 
Output gap 
parameter in 
Taylor rule Prior 0.1 - 
Tjahyono 
et.al 
(2006) 
14 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 
Smoothing 
parameter in 
Taylor rule Prior 0.5 - 
Tjahyono 
et.al 
(2006) 
 
 
3.8 Simulation and Results 
Table 3.2  The Estimation Results of The National Model 
 
Parameters Prior mean 
Prior 
Distribution 
Prior 
Stdev 
Indonesia 
(National) 
Post. mean 
𝜃𝜃 0.75 beta 0.1 0.4378 
𝜑𝜑 3 gamma 0.1 2.9392 
𝜖𝜖 6 gamma 0.1 5.9318 
𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋 1.5 normal 0.1 1.5701 
𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 0.1 normal 0.1 0.2704 
𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟 0.5 beta 0.1 0.2149 
Stdev of 
shocks 
Prior 
mean 
Prior 
Distribution 
Prior 
Stdev 
Post. mean 
𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦 0.001 inv.gamma Inf 0.0133 
𝜎𝜎𝜋𝜋 0.001 inv.gamma Inf 0.018 
𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 0.001 inv.gamma Inf 0.2506 
𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟 0.01 inv.gamma Inf 0.0078 
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Table 3.3  Estimation Results of The Regional Model 
 
Para-
meters 
Prior 
mean 
Prior 
Distri-
bution 
Prior 
Stdev 
Suma-
tra 
Jawa 
and 
Bali 
Kali-
mantan 
Sula-
wesi 
Eastern 
Indone-
sia 
Post. 
mean 
Post. 
mean 
Post. 
mean 
Post. 
mean 
Post. 
mean 
𝛼𝛼1 * beta 0.1 0.1738 0.1589 0.1782 0.2653 0.2849 
𝜃𝜃1 0.75 beta 0.1 0.3207 0.3916 0.3911 0.2266 0.6627 
𝜑𝜑1 3 gamma 0.1 2.8899 2.8837 2.8589 2.9097 2.8723 
𝜖𝜖1 6 gamma 0.1 5.9215 5.9233 5.9158 5.9299 5.9182 
𝜈𝜈1 1 gamma 0.1 1.0024 0.9935 1.0028 0.9993 0.9976 
𝜃𝜃2 0.75 beta 0.1 0.3501 0.3037 0.4341 0.4239 0.4476 
𝜑𝜑2 3 gamma 0.1 2.8905 2.8926 2.8883 2.8917 2.891 
𝜖𝜖2 6 gamma 0.1 5.9215 5.9268 5.9237 5.9212 5.923 
𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋 1.5 normal 0.1 1.5619 1.5068 1.5213 1.5377 1.5231 
𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 0.1 normal 0.1 0.3636 0.3676 0.329 0.3119 0.3072 
𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟 0.5 beta 0.1 0.0937 0.0822 0.1679 0.1516 0.2011 
Stdev 
of 
shocks 
Prior 
mean 
Prior 
Distribu
tion 
Prior 
Stdev 
Post. 
mean 
Post. 
mean 
Post. 
mean 
Post. 
mean 
Post. 
mean 
𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦1 0.001 
inv. 
gamma Inf 0.0277 0.0104 0.0287 0.0297 0.0397 
𝜎𝜎𝜋𝜋1 0.001 
inv. 
gamma Inf 0.0288 0.0189 0.0209 0.0292 0.0208 
𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔1 0.001 
inv. 
gamma Inf 0.2652 0.2342 0.2113 0.258 0.2523 
𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦2 0.001 
inv. 
gamma Inf 0.0088 0.0114 0.0118 0.0113 0.0122 
𝜎𝜎𝜋𝜋2 0.001 
inv. 
gamma Inf 0.0193 0.022 0.0175 0.0176 0.0173 
𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔2 0.001 
inv. 
gamma Inf 0.2316 0.231 0.2287 0.2305 0.2318 
𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟 0.01 
inv. 
gamma Inf 0.0086 0.0086 0.0082 0.0083 0.0083 
* : Sumatra = 0.17, Java and Bali = 0.16, Kalimantan = 0.18, Sulawesi = 0.27, Eastern 
Indonesia = 0.29 
 
Two models are used for simulation namely, national and regional DSGE model. 
The first model consists of equation (3.37), (3.44), (3.50), (3.32) and (3.45). The second 
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model has three parts. The first part is the region i’s system that consists equation of 
(3.41), (3.20), (3.39), (3.23), (3.26), (3.37), (3.50) and (3.32). The second part is the rest 
of the region or the region outside the region i’s system that comprises of equation 
(3.37), (3.44), (3.50), and (3.32). The last part is the national level equations which are 
(3.45), the aggregate inflation and output gap equations which are the weighted average 
of the regional inflation and output gap, respectively. These models will be estimated 
with Bayesian estimation using the actual dataset to get the current condition of the 
central bank’s behavior based on Taylor rule. Then, the Taylor rule parameters will be 
optimized based on the central bank’s objective.    
The results of Bayesian estimation and simulation of posterior distribution using 
Metropolis-Hasting yield the estimated parameters and standard deviation of shocks 
shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 above.  
 
3.8.1 Optimal Policy 
The optimal policy rule is obtained by simulating the model given the estimated 
parameters and estimated standard error of the regional shocks. Then, calculated using 
the linear-quadratic minimization problem as follows: min
𝛼𝛼
𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡′𝑌𝑌𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) 
st. 𝑃𝑃1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑃𝑃2𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃3𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 0 
where 𝛼𝛼 denotes the set of parameters to be optimized, in this case the inflation gap and 
output gap parameters in Taylor Rule equation, or 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋 and 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 respectively, 𝑦𝑦 are the 
endogenous variables in the model, 𝑒𝑒 are the exogenous stochastic shocks, 𝑃𝑃 are the 
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estimated parameter set, 𝐶𝐶 are the constant parameters of the exogenous shocks, and 𝑌𝑌 
are the weighted matrix of the objective function.   
In this study, the central bank’s objective is to minimize a weighted sum of 
unconditional second moments of the inflation gap and output gap, and it is assumed 
that both inflation gap and output gap have equal weight. Thus, the objective function 
above can be simplified into a loss function: 
𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐹𝐹𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛 = 𝜎𝜎𝜋𝜋�2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦�2 
where 𝜎𝜎𝜋𝜋�2 and 𝜎𝜎𝑦𝑦�2 are the variance of inflation gap and output gap respectively. 
Table 3.4 below shows the optimal policy parameters across regions and 
Indonesia country compared to the estimated parameters. Parameters in Taylor rule 
equation, 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋 and 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦 indicate how aggressive central bank should react under region 
shocks on the inflation gap and output gap, respectively. The higher the value, the more 
aggressive the central bank should react, and vice versa. The aggressiveness of the 
central bank can be shown by the higher or lower of the interest rate change compared 
to the common situation. The estimated parameters indicate the current behavior of the 
central bank to reduce the inflation and output gap. On the other hand, optimal 
parameters indicate the optimal behavior of the central bank which minimized the loss 
function of the central bank given the current economic structure and condition. 
From Table 3.4 below, the comparison between estimated and optimal 
parameters both in the national and regional model indicates that currently, the central 
bank is not reacting optimally, but reacting less aggressively than it is supposed to. In 
any model, the inflation gap parameters are higher compared to the output gap 
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parameters. This shows how important the central bank should manage the inflation gap 
across the regions. 
Table 3.4  Optimal Policy Parameters 
 
Region Parameter Type 
Parameters Loss 
Function 
Value 
Improve-
ment 𝑫𝑫𝝅𝝅 𝑫𝑫𝒙𝒙 
Sumatra 
Estimated 
Parameter 
1.5619 0.3636 1.503E-04 
49% Optimal 
Parameter 
1.9741 0.0306 1.007E-04 
Jawa and Bali 
Estimated 
Parameter 
1.5068 0.3676 8.459E-04 
86% Optimal 
Parameter 
1.9931 0.0129 4.552E-04 
Kalimantan 
Estimated 
Parameter 
1.5213 0.3290 2.057E-05 
46% Optimal 
Parameter 
1.6810 0.0611 1.412E-05 
Sulawesi 
Estimated 
Parameter 
1.5377 0.3119 8.469E-06 
18% Optimal 
Parameter 
1.6483 0.1276 7.167E-06 
Eastern 
Indonesia 
Estimated 
Parameter 
1.5231 0.3072 6.182E-06 
24% Optimal 
Parameter 
1.6192 0.1372 4.999E-06 
Indonesia 
(National) 
Estimated 
Parameter 
1.5701 0.2704 1.418E-03 
0.04% Optimal 
Parameter 
1.5702 0.2703 1.418E-03 
  
Before further analysis, it is better to ensure that the Impulse Response Function 
(IRF) of the model behaves correctly as in macroeconomics theory. In this simulation, 
four types of shock are going to be imposed on the Eastern Indonesia region, for 
example. From Figure 3.1 below, 1% increase in output gap (𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝1) in Eastern 
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Indonesia region would also increase the local inflation (𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓1) about 0.5% which in turn 
the central bank should increase the interest rate (r) by 2 basis points (bps) and the local 
government should reduce its expenditure (𝑔𝑔1) by 7%. This interest rate rise can be 
translated into about 0.4% reduction in real money balances. The shock from Eastern 
Indonesia region will only slightly affect the rest of the region as shown in the figures 
above because the domestic export in this region is very small. 
 
Figure 3.1  The IRF of 1% increase in Output Gap in Eastern Indonesia Region 
 
In the case of 1% increase in inflation in the Eastern Indonesia region, as shown 
in Figure 3.2 below, the output gap in this region will decrease by 1.5%. In response to 
this condition, the model suggested the central bank should increase the interest rate by 
3.16 bps or equal to -0.7% reduction of real money balance. Also, the government 
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should lower its spending by about 4%. The rest of the region inflation (infstar) will 
slightly increase by 0.02%, but its output gap (ygapstar), and government expenditure 
(gstar) will slightly drop.  
 
Figure 3.2  The IRF of 1% increase in Inflation in Eastern Indonesia Region 
 
The monetary policy transmission in this model can be shown from the interest 
rate shock in Figure 3.3 below. The 100 bps rise in interest rate is translated into 3.28% 
decrease in real money balances. It will reduce the inflation in Eastern Indonesia by 
0.7% and also its output gap by 0.8%. In addition, the inflation and output gap in the 
rest of the region also decline by 1.5% and 0.6%, respectively. As a response, the 
government in Eastern Indonesia and in the rest of the region should raise its spending 
by 9% and 15%, respectively.  
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Lastly, in Figure 3.4 below, suppose there is 1% increase in government 
expenditure in Eastern Indonesia. It will directly raise the output gap in this region by 
0.12% and also inflation by 0.03%. In this scenario, the central bank should slightly 
increase the interest rate by 0.15 bps or reduce the real money balances by 0.03%. The 
effects to the rest of the region are tiny, so we can ignore them. 
 
 
Figure 3.3  The IRF of 100 bps increase in Interest Rate 
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Figure 3.4  The IRF of 1% Increase in Government Expenditure in Eastern Indonesia 
Region 
 
3.8.2 Does Regional Disaggregation Matter? 
Comparing the national model and regional model can address this question. 
Since those models are different, the comparison cannot be made by just looking at the 
value of the loss function. One alternative way to make the value of loss function 
comparable is by plugging the Taylor rule parameters from the national model into a 
regional model.  
Table 3.5  Loss Function Comparison from Different Parameter Types Using Eastern 
Indonesia Model 
 
Parameter Type 
Parameters Loss 
Function 
Value 
% Diff 
𝑫𝑫𝝅𝝅 𝑫𝑫𝒙𝒙 
Optimized Parameter from Eastern 
Indonesia Model 1.619 0.137 4.999E-06 14% Optimized Parameter from National 
Model 1.570 0.270 5.705E-06 
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 Suppose there is a negative shock from Eastern Indonesia, and we want to see 
the performance of regional model as compared to the national model. In this case, the 
regional model that is used for the analysis is Eastern Indonesia model. Table 3.5 above 
shows the comparison of the loss function value from two different parameter types; 
first, the value of loss function using the optimized parameter from a regional model 
which indicates the optimal behavior of central bank given their objectives if they use 
the regional model; secondly, the loss function value using the optimal parameter from 
a national model which describe the optimal behavior of central bank if they utilize the 
national model. As can be seen, the regional model outperformed the national model 
when using optimized parameter by 14%. If the central bank is still using the national 
model for doing simulation when there is a regional shock, the results may no longer be 
optimal. Even though the difference of the loss function value is only 14%, both models 
might have different results, especially, policy recommendation. Thus, it is clear to say 
that regional disaggregation is important.  
 Besides the comparison of the loss function value, the importance of regional 
disaggregation can be shown by conducting the simulation experiments between 
national and regional model. There are two types of regional shocks in this experiment; 
first is negative supply shock which reflects the increase in inflation variables; second is 
demand shock which illustrates the increase in the output gap.   
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Figure 3.5  The IRF of 1% increase in inflation in Eastern Indonesia 
 
In negative supply shock scenario, there is a sudden increase in inflation in 
Eastern Indonesia by 1%. In the national model, this shock is translated into 0.037% 
increase in national inflation because the weight of Eastern Indonesia’s inflation to the 
national inflation is 3.7%. The results of this simulation are illustrated in Figure 3.5 
above. According to the regional model, the optimal policy for the central bank as a 
reaction to the 1% increase in inflation in Eastern Indonesia is increasing the interest 
rate by 3 bps. In addition, the fiscal authority should also decrease its spending by 4.3%. 
As consequences, the output gap in Eastern Indonesia drops by 1.47%. However, from 
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the national model, the central bank should only increase the interest rate by 1 bps. It 
seems that both models have a slightly different policy recommendation, but if the 
shock is getting bigger, then the different between both models would be also big as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6  The IRF of 1% increase in output gap in Eastern Indonesia 
 
In demand shock scenario, suppose there is a sudden jump in demand in Eastern 
Indonesia by 1%. This shock equals to 0.0415% increase in output gap in the national 
model. This number comes from the GDP weight of Eastern Indonesia in national GDP 
in 2015, which is 4.15%.  As can be seen from the regional model in Figure 3.6 above, 
1% increase in output gap in Eastern Indonesia would lead to the 0.5% increase in the 
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Eastern Indonesia’s inflation. If the central bank wants to react optimally, it should 
increase its policy rate (interest rate) by 2 bps. However, the national model gives us 
different policy recommendation, 6 bps which is 3 times more aggressive than the 
interest rate in the regional model. This aggressive policy could hurt the local economy 
which would not be happened if the central bank uses the regional model.    
From those two simulations, we can show that when the regional shocks hit the 
economy, the central bank should use a regional-DSGE model instead of the national-
DSGE model because the results from the national-DSGE model could be misleading. 
In this case, the national model is less aggressive in fighting the negative supply shock 
in Eastern Indonesia, and more aggressive in dealing with demand shock in Eastern 
Indonesia if we compared to the regional model. In summary, the regional DSGE model 
will help the policy makers of the central bank to determine how aggressive they should 
react when there are specific regional shocks. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the two-region DSGE model has been successfully developed in 
order to estimate and simulate the optimal monetary and fiscal policy given the regional 
shocks. Moreover, it can show how important the regional DSGE model compared to 
the national DSGE model. This model can give the central bank of Indonesia, Bank 
Indonesia, a new experience of utilizing DSGE model with a regional dimension and a 
better understanding of how to react given the specific shocks in particular region. 
  The results showed that currently, the monetary policy reaction function in 
Taylor rule is not optimal. The central bank of Indonesia did not react optimally to the 
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regional shocks given the objective function. In this case, the central bank was less 
aggressive in fighting the inflation gap. Fighting inflation gap should be the primary 
focus of the central bank since it will lead to the economic stability which is lower 
output gap. 
In this research, we also demonstrated that disaggregating national level into the 
regional level model would provide us with better performance in terms of the loss 
function. This means that if the central bank is still using the national level model to 
simulate the regional shocks, the policy recommendation from the national model is not 
optimal and could hurt some agents and regions in the economy. In the simulation, the 
policy response from the national DSGE model seems to be more aggressive than the 
policy response from the regional model when there is a demand shock in the Eastern 
Indonesia. On the other hand, when there is a negative supply shock, the national model 
is less aggressive than the regional model in term of policy response. Therefore, the 
regional aspect of the model when the regional shocks hit the economy cannot be 
ignored. 
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APPENDIX 
  
Optimal Allocation of Consumption, Money Demand and Labor 
The representative household seeking to maximize 
max
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ,𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
𝐸𝐸0
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
� 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜒𝜒) log𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜒𝜒 log𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 + �𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �
1−𝜈𝜈
1 − 𝜈𝜈∞𝑡𝑡=0
⎭
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎫
 
subject to 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
The Lagrange function is 
ℒ = 𝐸𝐸0
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
� 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜒𝜒) log𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜒𝜒 log𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 + �𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �
1−𝜈𝜈
1 − 𝜈𝜈∞𝑡𝑡=0
⎭
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎫
− 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − �𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�� 
The First Order Conditions (FOCs) are: 
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 : 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 0 (3.51) 
 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 : −𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
φ + 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 0 (3.52) 
 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  : 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜈𝜈
− 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 0 (3.53) 
 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖  : −𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1� + 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � = 0 (3.54) 
From (3.54) we have 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1
𝑖𝑖 �
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1� = 11 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (3.55) 
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From (3.51) and (3.55) yields 
𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
⇒ 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1� = 11 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =
𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡+1(1− 𝜒𝜒)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 −1
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
= 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 −1
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1� 
⇒  𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 −1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 � = 1 
 ⇒  𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1−1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 −1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 � = 1 (3.56) 
From (3.51) and (3.52) yields 
𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖φ𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
 ⇒
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖φ(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 (3.57) 
From (3.51) and (3.53), we have 
𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 �
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜈𝜈
𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1� = 1 − 11 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
⇒
�
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜈𝜈
(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (3.58) 
In log-linearized form the equation (3.56), (3.57), and (3.58) become 
⇒ log𝛽𝛽 + log(1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) − log𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − log𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + log𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = log 1 
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⇒ 𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 − Etπc,t+1𝑖𝑖 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 0 
 ⇒ ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 − �𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 − Etπc,t+1𝑖𝑖 � (3.59) 
 
 
⇒ log𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − log𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑 log𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + log𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − log(1 − 𝜒𝜒)  
 ⇒ 𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̂?𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.60) 
 
 
−𝜈𝜈 log𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + log𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − log(1 − 𝜒𝜒) = log 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
⇒ −𝜈𝜈
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝚤𝚤����
+ 𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝚤𝚤�
= 1 + 𝚤𝚤̅
𝚤𝚤 ̅
�
(1 + 𝚤𝚤)̅ − 𝚤𝚤̅(1 + 𝚤𝚤)̅2 � 𝚤𝚤̅ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤̅  
⇒ −𝜈𝜈
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝚤𝚤����
+ 𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝚤𝚤�
= 1(1 + 𝚤𝚤)̅𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤̅  
⇒ −𝜈𝜈𝑚𝑚�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 + ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1(1 + 𝚤𝚤)̅ 𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 
 
 ⇒ 𝑚𝑚�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜈𝜈 ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 1(1 + 𝚤𝚤)̅𝜈𝜈 𝚤𝚤̂𝑡𝑡 (3.61) 
 
Terms of trade and CPI Inflation 
Term of trade  
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝� �𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓10 = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝� 𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓10  (3.62) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is bilateral term of trade between region i and region f, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗ =
𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 ∫ 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓
1
0
 is the price index for domestic imported goods, 𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ log 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
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Let 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1−𝛼𝛼(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗)𝛼𝛼, then  
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝛼𝛼 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝛼𝛼 
In logarithmic: 
 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.63) 
CPI inflation becomes: 
 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼∆𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.64) 
Under the assumption of complete markets for the securities traded nationally, 
the first order condition analogous to equation (3.56) must hold for the representative 
household in any other region, say region f 
 1 = 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1−1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑓𝑓 −1
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓−1
� (3.65) 
Combine both FOC, equation (3.56) and (3.65) yields 
 
1 = 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1−1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
−1
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖−1
�
𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1−1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑓𝑓 −1
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓−1
�
= 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
−1
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖−1
�
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑓𝑓 −1
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓−1
�
= 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 −1𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 � 
(3.66) 
Solve for 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖: 
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𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
�
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑓𝑓
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑖𝑖 � 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓−1
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1 𝑓𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫ = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 ��𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 �𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓−1 �𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼�𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼 � 
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 ��𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓−1 �𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼�𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼 �
−1 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓�𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 �−(1−𝛼𝛼)�𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼�
= 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑓𝑓 �𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼� 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓�𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼 
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜛𝜛𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓�𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼 (3.67) 
where 𝜛𝜛𝑓𝑓 is some constant that will generally depend on initial conditions regarding 
relative net asset positions. Without loss of generality, let assume symmetric initial 
conditions, i.e. zero net foreign assets holdings and ex-ante identical environment. This 
implies 𝜛𝜛𝑓𝑓 = 𝜛𝜛 = 1 ∀𝑓𝑓.  
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓�𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼 (3.68) 
Taking logs yields: 
 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.69) 
Noted that the rest of region consumption is given by 
 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ ≡ � 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓
1
0
 (3.70) 
 
Therefore, integrating (3.69) using (3.70) yields 
 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = � �𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡�𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓1
0
= 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.71) 
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Aggregate Demand  
The market clearing for good j produced in country i requires 
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) + � 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 (𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓1
0
+ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) (3.72) 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜀𝜀
�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 � 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼� �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 � 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓
1
0
+ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 
           = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜀𝜀
�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 � 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼� 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓1
0
+ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 
           = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜀𝜀
�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼 � �𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �1−𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓1
0
+ 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 
           = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜀𝜀
�(1 − 𝛼𝛼)�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 
           = �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜀𝜀
�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
𝛼𝛼 + 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 
Thus, 
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝛼𝛼 + 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.73) 
Log-linearize around the steady state yields: 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛾𝛾)�?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.74) 
By aggregating over all regions, a national market clearing condition can be derived as: 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡∗ = � 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1
0
= � �(1 − 𝛾𝛾)�?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼?̂?𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1
0
= (1 − 𝛾𝛾)?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡∗ (3.75) 
Solve for ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡∗, yields 
 
?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡
∗ = 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡∗ (3.76) 
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Price Setting 
The objective function of the firms in setting up the price is 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
�
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)− 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)�� 
      = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
�
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜀𝜀
− 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �−𝜀𝜀�� 
      = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙�1−𝜀𝜀 − 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙�−𝜀𝜀�� 
where Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙 ≡ 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 …𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗−1𝑖𝑖  and Φ𝑡𝑡,0 ≡ 1. Note that 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)� is cost as a 
function of  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗),  
The FOC with respect to 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) is 
𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗) : 0 = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕 �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙�1−𝜀𝜀
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
−
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)
𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕 �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙�−𝜀𝜀
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
⎭
⎪
⎬
⎪
⎫
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤ 
               0 = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (1 − 𝜀𝜀)�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙�−𝜀𝜀 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 𝜀𝜀 �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙�−𝜀𝜀−1 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 � 
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               0 = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙�−𝜀𝜀 �Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 − 1𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) 1𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)� 
               0 = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙�−𝜀𝜀 �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙 − 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 − 1𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)� 
where 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗) is the real marginal cost of good j. We know that 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)Φ𝑡𝑡,𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 …𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙−1𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙−1𝑖𝑖 …𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖  
Thus, 
0 = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
−𝜀𝜀
�
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 −
𝜀𝜀
𝜀𝜀 − 1𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗)� 
Since all firms make the same decision, we can drop the good index j and define the 
optimum price 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. Let also define 𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, we can rewrite the FOC as 
 0 = Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
𝜀𝜀
�𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 −
𝜀𝜀
𝜀𝜀 − 1𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 � (3.77) 
The law of motion of the aggregate price is given by 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = �𝜃𝜃�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 �1−𝜀𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1−𝜀𝜀� 11−𝜀𝜀 (3.78) 
Powered by 1 − 𝜀𝜀 and divided by �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 �1−𝜀𝜀 yields 
�𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
1−𝜀𝜀 = 𝜃𝜃�𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 �1−𝜀𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1−𝜀𝜀 
1 = 𝜃𝜃 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �
1−𝜀𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1−𝜀𝜀 
Taking log and divided each by the steady state value yields: 
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0 = log �𝜃𝜃 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �
1−𝜀𝜀 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)�𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1−𝜀𝜀� 
Take a first order Taylor approximation on both sides around the steady state yields 0 = 0 + 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝜀𝜀)𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤�  
𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡
𝚤𝚤� = 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃) �𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 � 
Rewrite the FOC as 
𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃
𝑖𝑖�
𝑙𝑙
∞
𝑙𝑙=0
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
𝜀𝜀 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 = 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 − 1Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 �
𝜀𝜀
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖  
Now, by defining 
Γ𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �𝜀𝜀 ,Ω𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 , 𝑔𝑔𝜀𝜀 = 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 − 1 
In steady state, we have 
Γ𝑖𝑖��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�
𝑙𝑙
∞
𝑙𝑙=0
= Γ𝑖𝑖1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝜀𝜀 Γ𝑖𝑖1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝜀𝜀Γ𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
 
Taking log and a first order Taylor approximation on both sides around the steady state 
of the FOC yields 
log�𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
Γ𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 Ω𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 � = log�𝑔𝑔𝜀𝜀Ε𝑡𝑡��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙∞
𝑙𝑙=0
Γ𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖 � 
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log Γ𝑖𝑖1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤� + 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖Γ𝑖𝑖 �Γ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − Γ𝑖𝑖� + 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖Γ𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�Γ𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 − Γ𝑖𝑖� + ⋯
+ 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
Γ𝑖𝑖
Γ𝑖𝑖�Ω𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 − Ω𝑖𝑖� + 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
Γ𝑖𝑖
Γ𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�Ω𝑡𝑡+1
𝑖𝑖 − Ω𝑖𝑖� + ⋯
= log Γ𝑖𝑖1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖Γ𝑖𝑖 �Γ𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − Γ𝑖𝑖� + 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖Γ𝑖𝑖 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�Γ𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 − Γ𝑖𝑖� + ⋯
+ 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
Γ𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝜀𝜀Γ
𝑖𝑖�𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖� + 1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
Γ𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝜀𝜀Γ
𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1
𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖� + ⋯ 
 
𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡
𝚤𝚤� + �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�Ω�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖Ω�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + ⋯= �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + +�1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + ⋯ 
Substitute Ω�𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 , yields 
𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡
𝚤𝚤� + �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � + �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖��𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�2�𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+2𝑖𝑖 � + ⋯= �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + +�1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + ⋯ 
Rearrange it to: 
 𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤� + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖���𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �∞
𝑙𝑙=0
 (3.79) 
or 
 
𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡
𝚤𝚤� + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖��𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�
+ �𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖��1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖���𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡+1+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �∞
𝑙𝑙=0
 
(3.80) 
By taking expectation on equation (3.79) on both sides yields: 
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡+1𝚤𝚤 + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � = �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖���𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡+1+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1+𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 �∞
𝑙𝑙=0
 (3.81) 
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Substitute equation (3.81) into the equation (3.80), yields:  
𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡
𝚤𝚤� + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖��𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + �𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡+1𝚤𝚤 + 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 � 
Rewrite as: 
𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡
𝚤𝚤� = �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + �𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡+1𝚤𝚤 � 
 
Replace 𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝚤𝚤� = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�1−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖� �𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�, yields 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) �𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 �
= �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + �𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 � 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) �𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�� 
�
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)�𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
= 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)�𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
�
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) �𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + � 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)�𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
 𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖 + �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖��1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖�𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝛽𝛽) 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.82) 
Now, we need to derive the marginal cost. Given the assumption of linear technology as 
shown in equation (3.29), the real marginal cost in logarithmic form is  
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 � + �𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡 − (1 + 𝜑𝜑)𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = � 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜑𝜑�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − (1 + 𝜑𝜑)𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.83) 
Finally, the inflation equation is 
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𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 1(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋�𝑡𝑡+1𝑖𝑖
+ (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝛽𝛽) �� 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜑𝜑�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − (1 + 𝜑𝜑)𝑎𝑎�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� (3.84) 
 
Optimal Fiscal Policy 
 
Before we conduct a second order Taylor expansion of consumption, it needed 
to calculate Taylor expansion of log�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�. Let define the government spending 
share 𝛾𝛾 ≡ ?̅?𝐺
𝑖𝑖
𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖
 and define 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ log 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ log 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖. A second order Taylor expansion of log�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� around the steady state is given by 
log�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� ≃ log�𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖� + 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 � − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �
−
𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖
22(𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖)2 �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 �2 + 2𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖2(𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖)2 �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 � �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �
−
?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖
22(𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖)2 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �2 
                          = log �(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖� + 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 � − 𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �
−
𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖
22�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖�2 �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 �2 + 2𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖22�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖�2 �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 � �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �
−
�𝛾𝛾𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖�
22�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖�2 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �2 
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                         = log �(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖� + 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾) (𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡) + 12(1 − 𝛾𝛾) (𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡2 − 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡2)
−
12(1 − 𝛾𝛾)2 (𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡)2 
                         = log �(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖� + 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾) (𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡) − 𝛾𝛾2(1 − 𝛾𝛾)2 (𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡)2 
Thus, when considering fluctuations around the steady state, we can rewrite 
 log�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� ≃ 1(1 − 𝛾𝛾) (𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡 − 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡) − 𝛾𝛾2(1 − 𝛾𝛾)2 (𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡)2 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 (3.85) 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 denotes terms that are independent of policy.  
A Taylor expansion of consumption using equation (3.73), ∫ 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
1
0
= 0, and the fact 
that 𝛾𝛾 = 𝜒𝜒 
 
� log𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1
0
= � log�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� − 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1
0
= � log�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1
0
≃
1(1 − 𝜒𝜒)� (𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡 − 𝜒𝜒𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡)10 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
−
𝜒𝜒2(1 − 𝜒𝜒)2 � (𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡)210 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 
(3.86) 
Next, a Taylor expansion of logarithmic government expenditure is 
log𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≃ log ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 + ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 � − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖22?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖2 �𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 �2             = log ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 +𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 12𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 − 12𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2             = log ?̅?𝐺𝑖𝑖 +𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
Thus, when considering fluctuations around the steady state, we can rewrite 
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 � log𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1
0
= � 𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖1
0
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 (3.87) 
A second order Taylor expansion of the disutility of labor about a steady state is given 
by 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 ≃ 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 + 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ �𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖 � + φ2 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ �𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖 �2 
              = 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 + 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ �𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 12𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 2 � + φ2 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 
              = 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 + 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 12𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖1+φ(1 + φ)𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 
where 𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ log 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖. Under the optimal policy, the steady state of labor is given by 𝐼𝐼�𝑖𝑖 = 1. 
Thus, 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 = 𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 12 (1 + φ)𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 
Using the fact that 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� ∫ �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �−𝜖𝜖10 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗, where 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = ∫ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗10 , we can derive  
𝑛𝑛�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ log∫ �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �10 −𝜖𝜖. 
In proof of 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 below, we know that 
𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 ≃
𝜖𝜖2 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)� 
Using the fact that 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is independent of policy, we can rewrite the second order 
approximation to the utility of labor as 
 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 ≃ 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 12 (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 (3.88) 
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Since the real money balance is also independent of policy, the real money 
balance is not included in the welfare function. Thus, the aggregate welfare in Indonesia 
as a whole country in a second order approximation is 
𝕎𝕎𝑡𝑡 ≡ � 𝑈𝑈�𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 ,𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�1
0
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 
= (1 − 𝜒𝜒)� log𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1
0
+ 𝜒𝜒� log𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1
0
− �
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖1+φ1 + 𝜑𝜑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖10  
≃ � �𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 − 𝜒𝜒𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
1
0
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 −
𝜒𝜒2(1 − 𝜒𝜒)� �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�210 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜒𝜒� 𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖10
− � �𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 12 (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2� 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔10  
= −� �𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 12 (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜒𝜒2(1 − 𝜒𝜒) �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�2�10 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔 
The discounted sum of utilities across households is 
 𝕎𝕎𝑡𝑡 = −12�𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡∞
𝑡𝑡=0
� �
𝜀𝜀
𝜆𝜆
�𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
2 + (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�2�10 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 (3.89) 
The optimal policy in the present of nominal rigidities under discretion minimizes the 
loss function 
 � �
𝜀𝜀
𝜆𝜆
�𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
2 + (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�2�10 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 (3.90) 
subject to 
 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝛽𝛽) � 11 − 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜑𝜑�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝛾𝛾(1 + 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.91) 
 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 (3.92) 
The Lagrange function is 
 152 
 
 
ℒ = � �𝜀𝜀
𝜆𝜆
�𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖�
2 + (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�2�10 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
− 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 �𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 −
𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝛽𝛽) � 11 − 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜑𝜑�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜆𝜆𝛾𝛾(1 + 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛾𝛾)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� − 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� 
(3.93) 
The FOCs are 
 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 :    2𝜀𝜀𝜆𝜆 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.94) 
 
𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖:    2(1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 2𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜆𝜆(1 + 𝛽𝛽) � 11 − 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜑𝜑� − 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖= 0 (3.95) 
 𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 :    2𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� − 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝜆𝜆𝛾𝛾(1 + 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛾𝛾) + 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 = 0 (3.96) 
Combining equation (3.94), (3.95), and (3.96) yields 
 2(1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 2𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + 1(1 + 𝛽𝛽) � 11 − 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜑𝜑�2𝜀𝜀𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
= − 2𝜒𝜒
𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒) �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + 2𝜀𝜀(1 + 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛾𝛾) 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜒𝜒1 − 𝜒𝜒 �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� + 𝜀𝜀𝜑𝜑(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = − 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒) �𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� (1 + φ)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜑𝜑(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = − 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
𝜒𝜒 − 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾
𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒)𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = −�(1 + φ) − 𝜒𝜒 − 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒)�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝜑𝜑(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = −�(1 + φ)𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒)
𝜒𝜒 − 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾
− 1�𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝜑𝜑𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜒𝜒)(𝜒𝜒 − 𝜒𝜒𝛾𝛾)(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
using the fact that 𝛾𝛾 = 𝜒𝜒, yields the optimal fiscal policy: 
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 𝑔𝑔�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = −φ𝑦𝑦�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝜑𝜑(1 + 𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  (3.97) 
   
Proof of  𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
Let define 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡ log∫ �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(j)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �10 −𝜖𝜖 and ?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗) = 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗) − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡. A second order approximation 
of �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
�
1−𝜖𝜖
 is 
�
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
�
1−𝜖𝜖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝[(1 − 𝜖𝜖)?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)] ≃ 1 + (1 − 𝜖𝜖)?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗) + (1 − 𝜖𝜖)22 ?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)2 
From the definition of 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, we know that ∫ �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝑖𝑖)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
�
1−𝜖𝜖
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖
1
0
= 1. Thus, 
 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗{?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)} = 𝜖𝜖 − 12 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗{?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)2} (3.98) 
A second order approximation of �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
�
1−𝜖𝜖
is 
 �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
�
−𝜖𝜖
≃ 1 − 𝜖𝜖?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗) + 𝜖𝜖22 ?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)2 (3.99) 
Combining equation (3.98) and (3.99), yields 
� �
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
�
−𝜖𝜖
𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗
1
0
= 1 + 𝜖𝜖2𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡{?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)2} = 1 + 𝜖𝜖2 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟{?̂?𝑝𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)} 
Therefore, 
 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≃
𝜖𝜖2 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)� (3.100) 
 
